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NOTE
UNITED STATES V. RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE
BUILDING, ROOM 2113: A MIDNIGHT RAID ON
THE CONSTITUTION OR BUSINESS AS USUAL?
Brian Reimels'
"If men were angels, no government would be necessary."'
A leather briefcase, cold hard cash (literally), and a
telecommunications initiative in Africa only scratch the surface of one of
Washington, D.C.'s most recent scandals. Bribery and quid pro quo,
commonplace terms to describe the political landscape inside the Capital
Beltway, have sparked movements to clean up the so-called "culture of
corruption."2  But few cases have so enflamed the passions of
constitutional scholars, congressmen, and the Justice Department than
that of U.S. Representative William Jefferson.3 The Saturday night raid
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2008, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law; B.A., Temple University. The author would like to thank Jamie Wolszon for her
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guidance. Thank you also to Professor Clifford Fishman for his helpful insight towards
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1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
The quote continues by discussing the separation of powers among the branches of
government envisioned under the yet-to-be-ratified Constitution:
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controuls on
government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first
enable the government to controul the governed; and in the next place, oblige it
to controul itself. A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary controul
on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions.
Id.
2. Congressional Democrats coined the term "culture of corruption." Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Democrats Outline Agenda, Mostly Sparing the Specifics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2006, at A20. This Note uses the term to summarize the recent scandals and subsequent
attempts by both houses of Congress to address the alleged weaknesses in the laws
regarding lobbyists. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Push to Tighten Lobbying Rules Loses
Strength, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at Al.
3. See Reckless Justice: Did the Saturday Night Raid of Congress Trample the
Constitution? Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 10 (2006)
(prepared statement of Charles Tiefer, Professor, University of Baltimore Law School)
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of his congressional office in May 20064 and the ensuing litigation 5 have
sparked a fierce debate over the separation of powers between the
executive and legislative branches, the protocols used by the FBI and
federal prosecutors, and the scope of a seldom-invoked 6 legislative
privilege at the heart of the Jefferson case: the Speech or Debate Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.7
In United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2113, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
FBI violated the Speech or Debate Clause when its agents raided
8Jefferson's House office in 2006. Further, the court held that Jefferson
should have been afforded the opportunity to assert his constitutional
privilege over certain documents before the FBI seized them.9 The court
of appeals remanded the case to the district court to return to Jefferson
any documents it determines are protected by the Clause.' °
The decision addressed two important issues. First, the court of
appeals applied rules previously reserved for subpoenas to the criminal
search warrant obtained by the FBI." Second, the court rejected the
Government's contention that a neutral "filter team" tasked to search
[hereinafter Reckless Justice]; id. at 30 (prepared statement of Jonathan Turley, J.B. &
Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law, The George Washington University
Law School); Carl Hulse, FBI. Raid Divides G.O.P. Lawmakers and White House, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 2006, at Al; Kate Phillips, 2 Arms of Government Wrestle in Court, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2006, at All.
4. Hulse, supra note 3; see also Bruce Alpert, Jefferson Case Making Legal History,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), May 27, 2006, at A-1.
5. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113 (Rayburn I), 432
F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.D.C. 2006), rev'd sub nom., United States v. Rayburn House Office
Bldg., Room 2113 (Rayburn II), 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007). President Bush signed a
memorandum on May 25, 2006, ordering the Attorney General, acting through the
Solicitor General, to "preserve and seal" the documents seized. Memorandum on
Handling of Materials Held by the Department of Justice Following Execution of a Search
Warrant, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1018 (May 25, 2006). The memorandum expired
on July 9, 2006. Id; see also infra Part III.C-D.
6. Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the
Separation of Powers, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1113, 1114 & n.3 (1973).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. This clause provides:
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their
Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United
States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace,
be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their
respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
Id. (emphasis added).
8. Rayburn 11, 497 F.3d at 663.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 665.
11. See id. at 660.
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the congressman's office was sufficient to protect Jefferson's immunity.' 2
The court held that preventing Jefferson from asserting his privilege
while the search warrant was being executed in effect forced him to
disclose documents which were likely privileged and otherwise
unavailable to federal prosecutors for use at trial. 3
The Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution traces its roots
to fourteenth-century England. First created as a judicial remedy at a
time when Parliament housed many functions now controlled by
independent courts, the privilege shielded members from civil suits filed
against them while in office. 4 More than a century later, it was codified
as a mechanism to fend off systematic attacks by the Crown against
members of Parliament who disagreed with the King. 5 The clause in the
U.S. Constitution is based on the version contained in the English Bill of
Rights penned in 1689.16
The Speech or Debate Clause is one of two broad privileges the U.S.
Constitution affords members of Congress." Delegates at the
Constitutional Convention adopted the Speech or Debate Clause with
little discussion, ' as the drafters of the Constitution believed that a
speech privilege was a necessary element toward enforcing a separation
of powers among the three branches of government. 9
The Clause has seldom been an issue presented to courts in the United
States.2° When it has been presented, courts have generally ruled within
the boundaries of "pure" speech or debate; that is, they have applied a
literal reading of the Clause. 2' However, the Supreme Court has held
that the Clause should be read to include not only speeches made on the
floors of Congress but also activities conducted during a legislator's
22
normal course of business. When invoked, the Clause grants members
of Congress immunity from questions related to their activities and
speeches made as part of their legislative duties.23 Therefore, when the
12. See id. at 662.
13. See id. at 662-63.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 37-43.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 50-54.
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 1.
18. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
20. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1114 (noting that up to 1972, the
Supreme Court had heard only nine cases concerning the Clause).
21. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
22. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).
23. See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616 ("The Speech or Debate Clause .... protects
Members against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative
process."); see also McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
2008]
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Clause is applicable, the protection is absolute.24 These protections are
designed with two goals in mind: preventing overreaching by the
executive and judicial branches into legislative business and preventing
disruptions to legislators involved in civil suits and criminal prosecutions
founded on legitimate legislative activities.2 Nevertheless, courts have
been reluctant to apply the Clause in an overly broad manner such that it
could be used to stifle prosecutions of corrupt members.26 If privileged
materials are seized, courts have required the member to show that the
case against him is founded on his protected legislative activities.27
The Speech or Debate Clause was at the center of the litigation that
followed the search of Jefferson's House office. 8 For more than a year,
the congressman had been the focus of an investigation concerning his
involvement in business endeavors in both the United States and
29Africa. Prosecutors alleged that Jefferson, in his capacity as a U.S.
Representative, performed certain "official acts in promoting the sale of
communications equipment and related services ... [that would] provide
communication, data transfer, media, internet and other services in
Nigeria, Ghana and possibly other African Nations," in exchange for
cash payments and equity stakes in the ventures.30
After receiving substantial information from a cooperating witness, the
FBI obtained a warrant to search Jefferson's office for correspondence
and computer files relating to the various business interests. After the
FBI conducted an eighteen-hour search of his office on Saturday, May
20, 2006, Jefferson filed a motion for return of his property with the U.S.
(Leventhal, J.) (stating the Clause is an "exclusionary rule," a "testimonial privilege," and
a "substantive defense").
24. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975) (stating that the
Clause is "an absolute bar to interference" (citing Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314
(1973))).
25. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-75 (1951).
26. See Doe, 412 U.S. at 314-18 (discussing, with examples, the "finite limits" of the
Clause's protection). For instance, if during the course of a search or investigation either
the executive or judicial branches search or study some privileged effects, but prosecutors
or plaintiffs later exclude those effects from evidence, courts do not preclude prosecution
under that specific indictment. See United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1300-01
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (refusing to reverse a lower court's denial of a motion which would have
allowed an in camera review of materials to determine if a grand jury had
unconstitutionally examined privileged effects).
27. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d at 1300-01.
28. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113 (Rayburn 1), 432
F. Supp. 2d 100, 106 (D.D.C. 2006), rev'd sub nom., United States v. Rayburn House
Office Bldg., Room 2113 (Rayburn 11), 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
29. Id. at 105.
30. Affidavit in Support of Application of Search Warrant at 6-7, Rayburn 11, 497
F.3d 654 (No. 06-3105) [hereinafter Affidavit], available at http://www.npr.org/documents/
2006/may/sw.redacted.pdf.
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District Court for the District of Columbia on May 24.31 The district
court denied Jefferson's motion, holding that the FBI did not overstep its
bounds and that its execution of the warrant did not violate the Speech
or Debate Clause. 2 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
reversed, holding that the FBI should have afforded Jefferson the
opportunity to be present while the search was being conducted so that
he could assert his privilege." The court of appeals then ordered the
district court to return to Jefferson documents it determines are
privileged, but stopped short of requiring the FBI to return all the
documents seized that night. 34
Part I of this Note analyzes the historical underpinnings of the Speech
or Debate Clause. This part focuses on the Clause's English roots and its
favorable and non-controversial adoption into both the Articles of
Confederation and the U.S. Constitution. Part II of this Note discusses
the Supreme Court's and circuit courts' reading of the Clause as centered
around its two aspects: first, what is protected under "Speech or
Debate," and second, what is protected in terms of "questioning." This
part also examines practical implications including the distinction
between privileged legislative acts and unprotected political errands as
well as the Clause's focus on testimony as its core. Part II also examines
the underlying rationales for the Clause, and how they have guided the
application of the speech privilege. Part III details the federal
investigation into the alleged bribery scheme involving Jefferson and
several other associates. It then reviews both the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia's and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit's decisions relating to the search of Jefferson's
House office. Part IV analyzes the opinion rendered by the D.C. Circuit
in Rayburn, and concludes that the decision overextends the protections
of the Clause by failing to fully examine the applicability of the Clause to
search warrants and ignoring the "pure" reading of the Clause. Lastly,
this Note concludes that the separation of powers was not destroyed by
the FBI's search of Jefferson's office, and the precautions and procedures
used in this instance were sufficient to protect the independence of the
legislature and the congressman's privilege.
31. Rayburn 11, 497 F.3d at 656-57; see also Rayburn 1, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
32. Rayburn 1, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 113.
33. See Rayburn 11, 497 F.3d at 662-63.
34. Id. at 663.
2008]
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I. HUMBLE BEGINNINGS: DEVELOPMENT OF LEGISLATIVE FREE
SPEECH
A. Parliament's Displeasures Lead to a Codified Speech Privilege
Before its ratification in Article I of the U.S. Constitution, the Speech
or Debate Clause was a product of a British parliamentary system long
subdued and harassed by a hostile Crown.35 A discussion of the Clause's
roots from medieval Britain illuminates the modern-day interpretation
on which U.S. courts now rely.
36
While historians, scholars, and jurists normally begin their
examinations of the Speech or Debate Clause with the Tudor Crown that
began its reign in the late fifteenth century,37 several instances in the
preceding centuries suggest that the privilege existed as early as 1378.
Before the reign of the Tudors, Parliament was often at the King's beck-
and-call.38 In order to ensure control over and stability of the House, the
Crown provided Parliament with the ability to imprison and assert
jurisdiction over its own members.39  The reigning Crown, however,
vastly limited any other privileges. 40
In 1378, a prayer or preface recited before members gave protestations
in the House begged the King that if any speaker addressed the Crown in
a disapproving manner, that he be forgiven because the mishap was
clearly unintentional.41  The need for a formal recitation reflects the
42
members' level of apprehension and fear. The purpose of the prayer,
35. See Rayburn I, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 109 (noting that the English version of the
Clause resulted from the monarchy's attempt to "utilize[] the criminal and civil law to
suppress and intimidate critical legislators").
36. Moreover, many of the key decisions concerning the Speech or Debate Clause
have discussed the Clause's origin, including its roots in the British parliament. See United
States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368 (1980) ("The important history of the Speech or
Debate Clause has been related abundantly in opinions of this Court ... .
37. See, e.g., Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1122 & n.46.
38. See J.E. Neale, The Commons' Privilege of Free Speech in Parliament, in TUDOR
STUDIES 257,258 (R.W. Seton-Watson ed., Russell & Russell 1970) (1924).
39. Id. This grant of power, however, required members to petition the King prior to
invoking the right. Id.; see also DAVID LINDSAY KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485, at 44 (8th ed. 1966) (noting that the "privilege could
only be asserted by the complaisance of the King"); cf. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note
6, at 1123 & n.48 (noting the privilege's early dependence on the King).
40. See Neale, supra note 38, at 258. Parliament could not, for example, control its
own elections, excuse members prior to the end of a session, or set the time for the
beginning or ending of a session. Id.
41. Id. at 260.
42. See id. Lawmakers often faced the risk of punishment for slanderous speeches, or
simply those that upset the King. Id. However, both Edward III and Henry IV, in 1330
and 1399 respectively, had announced their intent to seek counsel from the Parliament.
See JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT 25 (1999). Despite
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therefore, "was not to safeguard a right to free speech, of which in fact
there is no hint, but to turn away the king's wrath in anticipation by an
apology., 43  Nineteen years later, the speech privilege reappeared in a
case involving a bill criticizing the Crown's lavish lifestyle.4 Historians
have credited the author of this bill, who asserted parliamentary speechS 4'
liberty in defending his actions, as an early proponent of a formal
privilege.4 The last years of the tumultuous reign of Henry IV saw the
those statements, the Crown continued to conflict (sometimes violently) with Parliament.
Id. at 26.
43. Neale, supra note 38, at 260. In the years following 1413, the prayer cited above
lost its stature as a necessary element in Parliament. Id. at 264. Historians believe that
this change occurred because of the growing independent nature of Parliament, or that
because of the repetitive nature of the phrase, it was simply reduced to a shorter version.
Id. Parliament found other ways to openly disagree with the King that did not involve the
use of judicial or parliamentary procedures. See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 42, at 26.
Rather, "they resorted to disobedience, armed rebellion, political trials, and as a last
resort, deposition." Id.
44. 2 WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 516-17, 624-
25 (4th ed., Barnes & Noble, Inc. 1967) (1897). Thomas Haxey authored a routine bill
criticizing the Crown, which was sent by the House of Commons to the House of Lords.
Edward E. Oppenheim, Congressional Free Speech, 8 LOYOLA L. REV. 1, 7 (1955-1956).
While previous monarchs had passed over similar bills, Richard II took exception, and
ordered Haxey arrested. He was tried by Parliament and sentenced to death. Id. A
petition filed during the first session of Parliament of Henry IV was granted (Haxey's bill
was presented during a session of Parliament under Richard II, whose crown was
abdicated to Henry), and Haxey was pardoned. See Neale, supra note 38, at 259
("[H]istorians have read . . . [Haxey's] condemnation [as] a breach of parliamentary
privilege.").
45. Neale, supra note 38, at 259.
46. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1125 & n.48. There remains doubt,
however, as to the veracity of this claim. There is no direct evidence that Haxey was a
member of Parliament, a status which would have been necessary to invoke the privilege.
Neale, supra note 38, at 259. The case only mentions Haxey's title and not any seat in
Parliament. See 2 STUBBS, supra note 44 at 516. Additionally, Haxey was imprisoned on
charges of treason, not slander. It would be unlikely that Haxey would offer a defense
founded on such a weak right as that of a parliamentary speech privilege. Furthermore,
the use of the term "commons" was not restricted to members of Parliament, and liberties
at that time likely did not include the freedom of speech. See Neale, supra note 38, at 259.
Therefore, "[i]f Haxey's Case did deal with the speech or debate privilege, it would be very
difficult to explain why this privilege was not asserted in the Speaker's Petition until a
century and a half later." Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1125 n.58. Such a right,
therefore, probably "afforded no real protection" for members of Parliament. Id. at 1125;
see also Oppenheim, supra note 44, at 8.
20081
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recurrence of the privilege, as the expectation of a right of free speech
started to become more commonplacei 8
By 1515, Parliament secured new independence from the Crown, 49 and
by 1523, members became emboldened enough to request more latitude
in their speeches, 0 while still recognizing the King's greater authority."
As members expressed the need for greater protection from the Crown,
Parliament may have recognized the formal privilege in 1542. 52 It took
thirty-three more years, however, before a member of Parliament fully
discussed it at length. 3 While the recognition was meaningful in that it
illustrated Parliament's resolve, the Tudor and Stuart monarchs of the
fifteen and sixteenth centuries sought to command Parliament by
consistently frustrating any such freedom.54
Privileges during the Tudor and Stuart periods both expanded and
contracted while Parliament, the Crown, and the courts endured
47. Neale, supra note 38, at 264-65. This change may be attributed to Parliament's
shift from petitions to bills, which required a full reading of the proposed law or act. Id. at
265. This change began during the reign of Henry VII, and in the decades that followed,
Parliament continued its transformation into a court, which led to the body's adoption of
additional speech privileges. Id.
48. Id. at 264-65.
49. Id. These new powers included the Speaker's ability to forbid members from
excusing themselves without his permission. This was an act the King once reserved for
himself, but was now controlled by the House. Id.
50. See id. at 267-69. The next instance of a speech privilege is found in a draft of a
speech given by Sir Thomas More in 1523. It included a long petition asking that "every
man [be able] to discharge his conscience, and bouldly in every thinge incident among,
declare his advise .... your noble Majestie of your inestimable goodnesse to take all in
good part." Id. at 268. Here, More did not ask for preemptive forgiveness, but rather for
the liberty of speech. While this does not mark the formal recognition of the right, it
shows the continuing movement of members towards the adoption of such a privilege. See
id. at 269.
51. See id. at 267. Elizabeth, in the sixteenth century, gave this rebuke to Parliament:
"Privilege of speech is granted but you must know what privilege you have; not to speak
everyone what he listeth, or what cometh in his brain to utter that; but your privilege is,
aye or no." Oppenheim, supra note 44, at 9 (citation omitted).
52. Neale, supra note 38, at 267.
53. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1124.
54. Cf GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 42, at 63-64. Henry VIII governed Parliament
under the belief that he made statutes alone, and the legislature merely offered advice. Id.
at 63. The other Tudor monarchs, mimicking Henry VIII, rarely held sessions of
Parliament, thereby reducing its stature. See KEIR, supra note 39, at 136. Queen
Elizabeth I harbored similar feelings about her power in relation to God. See T.E.
HARTLEY, ELIZABETH'S PARLIAMENTS: QUEEN, LORDS AND COMMONS 1559-1601, at
93 (1992). Elizabeth claimed that her power ranked just under God's, and "she had full
power 'by the law of the Crown."' Id. When Parliament would take up issues concerning
the Church and religious establishments, Elizabeth "made it clear that the mere reception
and 'public reading' of the petitions was folly, for the enemies of the realm could now, as a
result, pour scorn on her goodwill and ability." Id.
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extensive discord." Often, the Crown attempted to limit the extent of
56privileges. For example, the Crown limited freedom of speech,
particularly when discussing the prerogatives of the King57 or the
succession of the Crown. When members attempted to broaden their
privileges, the Crown rebuffed, oftentimes handing down lengthy prison
sentences or fines.5 9 Throughout the Tudor monarchy, "freedom of
speech ... was a privilege held on a precarious tenure.
The Stuart monarchs faced similar problems6' and reacted swiftly,
much like their Tudor counterparts.6 In one Parliament debate over war
appropriations in 1629, the passions of the House and Crown boiled
over." The Speaker of the House "was held down in his chair" while the
opposition party, led by Sir John Eliot, announced resolutions to the full
House.64 The Crown arrested Eliot and other members, who were
55. It has been argued that the privileges of Parliament were kept indefinite and were
often changed to thwart attempts by a hostile Crown to intimidate the legislature. See
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *159-61. Blackstone claimed that had
Parliament laid out their privileges in a definitive manner, the Crown would easily craft a
plan outside those parameters and continue to harass the legislature without pause. Id.
56. See KEIR, supra note 39, at 146. Privileges, for example, were valid only against
other persons. Id. Houses of Parliament, however, acted as their own courts to enforce
these privileges. Id. at 146-47.
57. Id. at 149. In 1559, for example, Henry VIII added a condition "that members be
'neither unmindful nor uncareful [sic] of their duties, reverence, and obedience to their
sovereign."' Id. (citation omitted). Elizabeth thought that Parliament's discussion about
religious establishments was "anti-prerogative and anti-statutory." HARTLEY, supra note
54, at 93.
58. See HARTLEY, supra note 54, at 60-63. Elizabeth, over her objection, often was
presented bills and speeches from Parliament regarding her refusal to appoint an heir to
the throne. See id. at 60. Elizabeth insisted that she alone should decide the matter, and
the position caused conflict between the Crown and Parliament. Id. at 63. Elizabeth
denied that she had any ill will toward Parliament, and offered support for the Commons'
"liberties." Elizabeth, however, made her objections known, and Parliament did not
discuss the general succession issue again. Id.
59. KEIR, supra note 39, at 149.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 187-88. On one occasion in 1621, members asserted the speech privilege
against King James I. The King reacted by destroying pages of the Parliament journal and
shutting down legislative sessions. Id. Parliament's action allegedly represented the "first
time [Parliament] had challenged the Crown's control over powers hitherto regarded as
essential to the discretionary authority of kingship." Id. at 188.
62. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1127 ("The Crown's arsenal included
the practices of issuing direct orders to the Speaker to cease debate on sensitive topics,
spreading rumors of royal displeasure and threats of retaliation, bribing corruptible
members of Parliament, summarily arresting others and arraigning them before the Star
Chamber and other secret, inquisitorial bodies, or committing them directly to the Tower
of London.").
63. See KEIR, supra note 39, at 195.
64. Id.
20081
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convicted and imprisoned for making seditious speeches, despite
asserting the formalized parliamentary speech privilege at trial.65
The English Revolution of 1689 capped years of tumult in the nation as
well as the "cataclysmic confrontation between the Crown and
Parliament." 66 In its wake, Parliament adopted a Bill of Rights that
greatly reduced the power of the King's prerogatives while expanding the
• 67
sovereignty of legislature. It is this document which formally codified
the speech privilege, and which the American Founding Fathers adopted
almost in its entirety when drafting both the Articles of Confederation
and the Constitution. 68
B. Adoption Across the Pond: The Clause Enters the American
Political Landscape
The congressional speech privilege codified in the U.S. Constitution
was not an invention of the Founding Fathers, but rather a recognition of
the obstacles their British counterparts faced centuries before.6 9 The
Framers held the doctrine of parliamentarian sovereignty with high
regard - so much so that congressional freedom of speech was "taken as
a matter of course by those who served the Colonies from the Crown and
founded our Nation.,
70
The Framers benefited from the experiences of state and local
governments that had codified a speech or debate privilege in their
political systems well before the Constitutional Convention of 1787.71
Most of the original colonies adopted clauses into their state
constitutions that were nearly identical to the one found in the English
Bill of Rights.72  Some went further. The Massachusetts and New
65. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1127-28. Parliament overturned the
conviction in 1641. Id. at 1128.
66. Id. at 1129.
67. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 42, at 159.
68. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1138-39. The English Clause read: "the
freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or
questioned in any court or place out of Parliament." Id. at 1129 1 W. & M. 2d sess., c.2
(1689).
69. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
70. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951).
71. See Oppenheim, supra note 44, at 11-12.
72. Maryland, in 1776, was the first state to adopt a speech or debate clause into its
state constitution. Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege in
State Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 231 & n.25 (2003). As states entered the
Union, they generally included a similar provision. Id. at 231 & nn.25-26. Currently,
forty-three states contain a privilege similar to the Clause. See id. at 308-18 (providing a
list of state constitutional provisions and the various constructions of their legislative
speech privileges); see also Tenney, 341 U.S. at 375 & n.5 (examining the history of the
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Hampshire Constitutions, for example, included a phrase proclaiming
that the privilege is "so essential to the rights of the people" that
speeches cannot be used for any prosecution or civil suit.73 The drafters
of the Articles of Confederation likewise adopted the privilege, using a
version similar to those found in the various state constitutions; the
74
clause was inserted when the Articles were near completion, without a
hint of debate or contention among the delegates.75
By the time the Founding Fathers met to draft the Constitution, there
was little left to discuss about the privilege." While the delegates
engaged in a vocal debate concerning their fears about the expansion of
legislative power," the Speech or Debate Clause only drew a modicum of
dialogue. James Madison wished to explicitly define the boundaries of
the privilege within the text of the Constitution.7 ' Delegate William
Pickney put forward a plan that would have allowed each house to
decide the precise definition of its privilege.79 The convention rejected
differing state constitutional provisions). Tenney centers on the privilege as applied to
California state legislators. 341 U.S. at 369-72.
73. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXI ("The freedom of deliberation, speech and debate,
in either house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot
be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or complaint, in any other court
or place whatsoever."); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX.
74. See MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 181 (1940). Jensen
contended that the adoptions of such privileges "[we]re indicative of a realistic
appreciation of the facts of life and politics in the eighteenth century." Id. at 182. This
view further buttresses the argument that the Framers were certain of the necessity for
specific legislative privileges by the time they drafted the Articles and the Constitution.
Id. at 181-82.
75. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1136; id. at 1136 n.122 ("We could find
no debate on the language, scope, or purpose of this provision in the Articles
Convention.").
76. See id. at 1138-39.
77. Madison feared that "[t]he legislative department is ... extending the sphere of
its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex." THE FEDERALIST NO. 48
(James Madison), supra note 1, at 333. An anti-federalist feared that the speech or debate
clause would not hold members to "account for his acts to his constituents." 2 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 327 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). The
writer would instead read the Clause to say that a member would not be questioned in any
other place "except when they shall be called upon for that purpose by their constituents."
Id.
78. See Alexander Celia, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech
or Debate: Its Past, Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 15 (1968); see also Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1139-
40.
79. CelIa, supra note 78, at 14.
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both proposals. ° In fact, at the time of the drafting, few statesmen had
recorded notes on the scope of the privilege as codified .8
II. AMERICAN INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATIVE FREE SPEECH
The Clause is, as one court has put it, "deceptively simple. 8 2 It
precludes congressmen from being "questioned" about "any Speech or
Debate" in any place. 83 Beyond these terms, however, courts have relied
on the placement of the English Clause within the American system of
government, the underlying rationales for the Clause, and the ever-
changing realities of a modern Congress.84 This Part discusses the courts'
definition and scope of what has been defined as "legislative business"
stemming from the notion of "Speech or Debate" and then reviews the
interpretation of "question[ing]" as written in the Clause.
A. "[F]or any Speech or Debate": The Development of the
Legislative Business Test
An early case from Massachusetts, the first to delineate the scope of
the privilege as adopted in this country, shed some additional light on the
Clause's overall protections. In Coffin v. Coffin, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that the clause, as adopted in the
Massachusetts Constitution, should be read liberally, to realize its "full
design."' 6 The case concerned an allegation of slander against a member
of the state house.8' After debate on a resolution that would appoint a
80. Id.
81. One reason for the lack of discussion, as previously mentioned, was that the
Clause was firmly rooted in several state constitutions. See supra note 72 and
accompanying text. In one pamphlet regarding the ratifying convention held in
Massachusetts, James Sullivan, a supporter of the Constitution, wrote that the document
"amply provided for" the freedom of debate. James Sullivan, Cassius, IX, MASS.
GAZETTE, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 33 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., 1892). Sullivan contended that "[tJhe necessity of such regulations
must appear plain to every one; the inhabitants of Massachusetts, fully convinced of the
justness of such provision, made it in the constitution of this state." Id.
82. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 415 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
84. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972).
85. See generally Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. (4 Tyng) 1, 5-6, 16 (1808) (discussing the
scope of the Speech or Debate Clause).
86. Id. at 27.
87. Id. at 1. William Coffin sued in the Court of Common Pleas for slander, alleging
that the defendant damaged his "good name, fame, and reputation." Id. at 2. He
prevailed in the lower court, and was awarded fifteen dollars, though his suit had
estimated damages at five thousand dollars. Id. at 2-3.
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notary public for Nantucket, Micajah Coffin, a state representative,
approached a fellow member in a "passage-way" of the capital building
and inquired about William Coffin, a witness who testified about the
appointment.8 Micajah Coffin made statements concerning William
Coffin's involvement in a criminal prosecution for allegedly robbing a
bank."' A suit for slander followed, and Micajah Coffin defended on
grounds that the clause made "no restriction" on a member's freedom to
debate within the walls of the state house.9'
The court held that the clause codified in the state's constitution was
designed to protect the entire legislative body, not individual members.9'
The purpose of the privilege, the court reasoned, was not to shield
members from prosecution, but rather to allow legislators the ability to
function in their roles without fear of reprisal. 92  Therefore, the
protection "ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally." 93  This
88. Id. at 3. The parties are not related; Coffin was a common name in Nantucket,
the city in which they both resided. Id.
89. Id. at 2. The court found William Coffin not guilty. The fellow member involved
in the conversation, Benjamin Russell, informed Micajah Coffin of this fact, to which he
replied: "That does not make him the less guilty." Id. This conversation served as the
basis for the civil suit, and Russell served as the primary witness. Id. at 5. Micajah Coffin
did not contest Russell's testimony. The only issue presented by his counsel concerned the
legislative privilege. Id. For an analysis of the prior law and arguments made to the
Supreme Judicial Court for both sides, see Cella, supra note 78, at 18-28.
90. Coffin, 4 Mass. (4 Tyng) at 8.
91. Id. at 27. While the opinion includes much discussion, the portion that concerns
this Note is the opinion of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, Theophilus
Parsons. Parsons was considered one of the "best legal minds in Massachusetts" at the
time of his appointment to the bench. Dale A. Oesterle, Formative Contributions to
American Corporate Law by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from 1806 to 1810,
in THE HISTORY OF THE LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS: THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
1692-1992, at 127, 128-29 (Russell K. Osgood ed. 1992) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE
LAW]. He is credited with shaping the "basic legal definition [of] the American business
corporation." Id. at 129. Parsons was considered conservative and a supporter of the
Federalists. See Russell K. Osgood, The Supreme Judicial Court 1692-1992: An Overview,
in HISTORY OF THE LAW, supra, at 9, 21; see also THEOPHILUS PARSONS, MEMOIR OF
THEOPHILUS PARSONS 36-37 (1859). Before his tenure as Chief Justice, Parsons was a
member of the Essex Junto, a group of citizens opposed to the first state constitution
drafted by the state legislature. See PARSONS, supra, at 45-53. After defeating that
version at the polls, Parsons became a delegate to the state constitutional convention held
between 1779 and 1780. He was one of twenty-six committee members charged with
writing the actual document. See id. at 55-57. He later served as a delegate to the state
convention that ratified the U.S. Constitution, but only after the body agreed to send his
recommendations to the Federal Convention. One of those recommendations was later
incorporated into the Tenth Amendment. Oesterle, supra, at 128 n.8. It should come as
no surprise, then, that he was charged with interpreting a constitutional clause from a
document he himself helped to craft.
92. Coffin, 4 Mass. (4 Tyng) at 27.
93. Id.
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ruling extended protection beyond floor speeches and debates to include
votes, written reports, and "every other act resulting from the nature,
and in the execution, of the office., 94 The privilege was limited, however,
to those arenas that were specifically within the realm of the legislative
body.95 This holding represents the first American interpretation of the
scope of the parliamentary privilege, specifically laying out the limits of
the term "for any speech or debate.,
96
In this light, the Supreme Court issued its first decision concerning the
scope of the privilege in Kilbourn v. Thompson.97 In Kilbourn, the
Supreme Court followed in the footsteps of Coffin, by adopting a liberal
test when applying the terms of the Speech or Debate Clause.98 In
Kilbourn, a House committee was tasked with investigating a bankrupt
corporation. The committee subpoenaed testimony and documents
from Hallett Kilbourn.'00 He appeared in person, but refused to comply
with the subpoena's demands.'9 ' The committee, in turn, recommended
that Kilbourn be held in contempt of the House.1°2 The committee sent
the recommendation to the Speaker of the House, Michael Kerr, who
issued a warrant for Kilbourn and ordered the sergeant-at-arms, John G.
Thompson, to arrest him."" Kilbourn, who was imprisoned in a
94. Id. Parsons added that the Clause protects those activities that may violate
House rules, and those arising out of work done in committee and between both Houses.
Id. at 27-28.
95. For example, Parsons limited the protection to "a representative, in the exercise
of the functions of that office." Id. at 27. When he is not acting as a representative, he is
entitled to no more protection than that afforded private citizens. Id. at 28-29.
Furthermore, the House must be in session in order for the member to claim the privilege.
Id. at 28. Later, Parsons reiterated that the representative must be exercising his duties as
a legislator in order to invoke the privilege. Id. at 31. If the member is not executing his
duties, then he will be unable to claim protection from the Clause, even if the words were
uttered within the walls of the House. Id. Parsons concluded that "[in either case, the
words must be spoken officially." Id. at 33.
96. Id. at 16, 34; see also Cella, supra note 78, at 28.
97. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
98. See Michael R. Seghetti, Speech or Debate Immunity: Preserving Legislative
Independence While Cutting Costs of Congressional Immunity, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
589, 589, 591 (1985).
99. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 171. The corporation, Jay Cooke & Company, was a real
estate venture based in Washington, D.C. See Susan Low Bloch & Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Celebrating the 200th Anniversary of the Federal Courts of the District of Columbia, 90
GEO. L.J. 549, 567 (2002). The corporation listed the United States as a creditor.
Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 193.
100. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 172.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 170. The House also denied Kilbourn the right to counsel at the
arraignment for the contempt charge. 2 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES § 1608 (1907).
103. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 173.
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Washington, D.C. jail for forty-five days, filed an action for false
imprisonment against the five members of the committee, Kerr, and
Thompson. ' 4
The individual members asserted that the Clause protected their
actions as members of the committee, and thus they could not be liable
for recommending that the House hold Kilbourn in contempt.'05
Addressing the privilege, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Samuel
Miller,' O reviewed the basis of the Clause, including the peculiar
construction of the legislative branch.i °7 Using both Coffin and Justice
Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution as a backdrop, the
Court adopted a liberal reading of the Clause to protect the actions of
the committee. Discerning that the underlying rationales of the
privilege were designed to apply to written reports presented in
committees, resolutions, speeches, and voting, the Court constructed the
so-called "legislative business" test.' °9 This test extends the Clause's
protections to "things generally done in a session of the House by one of
its members in relation to the business before it."1' 0
Thus, Kilbourn and the "legislative business" test became the
foundation for defining and broadening the protection implied by the
term "for any Speech or Debate" in the U.S. Constitution."1 ' In
104. Id. at 170.
105. Id. at 200. Only Thompson was held personally liable in the suit for false
imprisonment. The individual members only could be held liable for initiating the
imprisonment, not as individuals who actually detained Kilbourn. Id. Therefore, the
Speech or Debate Clause would apply to their conduct as members of the committee who
relayed to the Speaker the events that caused him to issue the warrant to the sergeant-at-
arms. Id.
106. Justice Miller generally took a cautionary role when reviewing the limits of
powers bestowed upon Congress. For instance, in a letter dated four years prior to
Kilbourn that discussed the one-hundredth anniversary of the Constitution, he "expressed
the belief 'that the House is gradually absorbing all the powers of the government."'
CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890, at 332
(1939). This "apprehension dominates the [Kilbourn] opinion" that he authored. Id.
While Justice Miller's trepidation primarily related to the Court's decision to strike down
the House's holding of Kilbourn, it also may explain the fact that Kilbourn did not extend
the privilege to the sergeant-at-arms, but only to the elected representatives as explicitly
provided for in the Constitution. Id.
107. See Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 201. The Court, before reaching its decision, recognized
that if the defendants were not members of the House, "they would have been liable for
the action which they had thus promoted." Id.
108. Id. at 203-04.
109. Id. at 204.
110. Id.
111. E.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 51 (1964)
("Kilbourn set the tone for the whole subsequent body of Constitutional litigation on
Congressional inquiries."); Seghetti, supra note 98, at 589 ("Today, courts continue to
follow the Kilbourn approach.").
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expanding upon Kilbourn, the Supreme Court has combined the
legislative business test with a focus on the rationales behind the
privilege - enforcing the separation of powers and preventing disruption
• . • • 112
to the legislative process - as guidelines in its decisions. From this, the
Court has further defined legislative business and the scope of "Speech
or Debate" as concerning those activities within the "legitimate
legislative sphere,"'. 13 and those that are categorized as "political
matters."
114
B. Further Delineating Legislative Business
In United States v. Johnson, the Supreme Court for the first time
applied the Clause directly to a criminal prosecution against a member of
Congress."5 The prosecution alleged that a congressman accepted bribes
to pressure members of the executive branch and to deliver a speech on
the House floor praising certain savings and loan institutions."' The
Court held that the prosecution "contravened" the Clause by questioning
witnesses about the motive for, construction and substance of, and
factual material supporting the congressman's speech." 7  While
recognizing that Kilbourn did not reach the criminal indictment issues
presented in the case,"' the Court nevertheless retained the view that the
112. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 369 (1980) (discussing the court's
renewed emphasis on the twin rationales of legislative independence and enforcing the
separation of powers); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972) (discussing the
necessity of interpreting the Clause in light of its underlying rationales and of American
history).
113. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491,503 (1975).
114. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512.
115. 383 U.S. 169 (1966). While the Court decided this case several decades after
Kilbourn, it acknowledged that no precedent controlled its decision. Id. at 179.
116. Id. at 171-72. The defendant, Thomas F. Johnson, was a representative from
Maryland. See Note, The Bribed Congressman's Immunity from Prosecution, 75 YALE
L.J. 335, 335 (1965) [hereinafter Bribed Congressman]. He was indicted and convicted of
seven counts of violating the conflict of interest statute and one count of conspiring to
defraud the United States. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 170. Johnson allegedly attempted to
influence members of the Justice Department who were investigating a mail fraud scheme
involving members of a Maryland savings and loan. See Bribed Congressman, supra, at
335; see also Johnson, 383 U.S. at 171-72. Congressman Frank Boykin of Alabama also
was indicted and convicted for attempting to persuade the Justice Department as a part of
the overall scheme. See Celia, supra note 78, at 31. Boykin, however, did not appeal his
conviction. Id. at 31-32.
117. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 184-85; see id. at 172-77 (providing details about the
prosecution's case and specific questions asked at trial relating to the speech).
118. Id. at 179-80. The Court distinguished Tenney v. Brandhove on the same grounds,
saying that both cases were "born primarily of a desire to avoid private suits." Id. at 180-
81; see infra text accompanying notes 134-38.
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Clause should be read broadly, so as to "effectuate its purposes.""' 9 To
do so, the Court precluded criminal prosecutions based upon a general
criminal statute requiring inquiry into the speech itself.2 But rather than
broaden the holding to cover more than the specific statute at issue, the
Court ruled narrowly based upon the "prophylactic purposes" behind the
Clause, reasoning that such criminal prosecutions offend the same
principles implicated by the traditional libel and treason suits upon which
the Clause was originally based."' Further, the Supreme Court has read
the language of the Clause to protect only past legislative acts and not
future conduct, such as promises to deliver speeches or votes in a certain
122
manner.
While the scope of the Clause was expanded to preclude inquiry into
the motives behind a particular speech, the Court did not proscribe
inquiry into the motives behind activities outside those first described in
Coffin and Kilbourn. In United States v. Brewster, the Court limited the
term "legislative business" to those activities that occur "in the regular
course of the legislative process."' ' 3 Privileged activities must be clearly a
part of the legislative process. 24 Taking a bribe is neither part of the
legislative process nor a legislative act itself; thus, the Clause would not
prohibit inquiry into the purpose behind a bribe."' Indicting a
congressman based upon activities "that are casually or incidentally
related to legislative affairs but not a part of the legislative process
126itself," the Court therefore held, is permissible.
After Brewster, the Court continued to narrow the scope of
impermissible inquiry into legislative activities. In Gravel v. United
119. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180.
120. Id. at 184-85.
121. Id. at 182-83 & n.13; see also United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 489 (1979)
(concluding that references to past legislative acts were impermissible in a criminal
prosecution of a member of Congress).
122. See Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 489-90. Cf United States v. Eilberg, 465 F. Supp. 1080,
1084 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that a legislative aide's expected testimony regarding a
member's contact with an executive branch officer was communication outside the realm
of legislative activity).
123. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972).
124. Id. at 515-16. Thus, the Court refused to extend the expansive reading of
Kilbourn and the rationale underscoring Coffin. See id. at 513-15. Furthermore, the Court
stressed that no case has considered extending the speech privilege to all activities relating
to the legislative process. Id. at 515. Only activities that fall within the "due functioning of
the process" are privileged. Id. at 515-16 (emphasis in original).
125. Id. at 526. The Court underscored this point in no uncertain terms. In discussing
the necessary elements of a successful bribery conviction, the Court ruled that the
prosecution need only show that a congressman accepted money, and not that he
performed any act as a result. Id. at 526. The Court explicitly permitted the Government
to prosecute without having to introduce evidence of legislative motive. Id. at 527.
126. Id. at 528.
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States, the Court definitively further limited "legislative business" to
activities that are an "integral part of the deliberative and communicative
processes" of members participating in prescribed legislative matters.
1 7
Thus, the Clause extends beyond actual speech and debate "'only when
necessary to prevent indirect impairment"' of legislative activities.
Stated differently, in order to receive the protections of the Clause, the
activity must be "part and parcel of the legislative process. ' '129 Thus, the
Court refused to protect a congressman from suit relating to the third-
party publishing of a committee report.3
After Johnson, Brewster, and Gravel, the "legislative business" test
continued to be the guide to determine whether activities were privileged
under the Clause. 3 ' This was done in the face of an ever-modernizing
Congress, the addition of congressional staff and attorneys, and the
increasing variety of civil and criminal litigation.32 In Tenney v.
Brandhove, for example, the Court privileged legislative investigations,
describing them as "an established part of representative government. '
The Tenney Court, in an effort to decide the case on the limited issue
presented, held that the judicial branch would limit legislative
investigations only when they impermissibly extend into functions solely
reserved for another branch of government.' 34  Therefore, when a
committee called a fellow legislator as a witness to testify about matters
properly within the committee's scope, the Clause provided no shield to
the targeted legislator.'35 Further, the Court has endorsed the use of
127. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
128. Id. (quoting United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 760 (1st Cir. 1972), vacated,
Gravel, 408 U.S. 606). Doe was the court of appeals case that preceded Gravel. Senator
Mike Gravel of Alaska intervened before it reached the Supreme Court. Doe, 455 F.2d at
756.
129. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 626.
130. Id.
131. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975) ("We reaffirm
that once it is determined that Members are acting within the 'legitimate legislative
sphere' the Speech or Debate Clause is an absolute bar to interference." (citing Doe v.
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314 (1973))).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972) (arguing that the
Clause should be interpreted in light of the American experience, "in the context of the
American constitutional scheme of government," and recognizing that the English
government differs greatly from the American system of power distribution). The Court
in Brewster also referred to the ever-expanding duties of the congressional office,
mentioning the many errands now performed in addition to normal legislative activities.
Id. at 512; see also Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616-17 (recognizing the "complexities of the modern
legislative process" where the legislative sessions are year-round, and where members
operate with the assistance of many different aides and additional staff).
133. 341 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1951).
134. Id. at 378.
135. Id.
[Vol. 57:293
A Midnight Raid on the Constitution?
congressional subpoenas as a tool to further proper "legislative
business."' 6 It reasoned that if the privilege could protect members from
authorizing an investigation but not protect them from exercising their
investigative authority, the Clause and the legislative branch's functions
would be weakened.
37
In privileging Congress's investigatory powers, the Court also
protected comments and remarks made during committee hearings and
in committee reports. 38 This argument was buttressed by McSurely v.
McClellan, a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. 39  In that case, the court ruled that a Senate
subcommittee's members and aides were immune from a civil suit arising
from certain documents that had been obtained illegally. Even though
the police had wrongfully obtained the materials, the senators who used
them in committee as the basis for subpoenas were immune from
prosecution.'4
C. Unprotected Activities
While the Court has extended the Clause to shield members from
questions and prosecutions relating to activities beyond "pure" speech
and debate, it has been reluctant to include some of the customary duties
of modern-day legislatures. These "political errands" were not an issue
136. See U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. at 504.
137. Id. at 505.
138. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312 (1973). A lawsuit was filed by parents of
school children in the District of Columbia against several members of the Special Select
Subcommittee of the Committee on the District of Columbia. The committee was charged
with investigating city agencies. Id. at 307-09. The subcommittee released a 450-page
report that summarized the hearings and investigation of the city's school system. Id. at
308. The report contained forty-five pages that specifically mentioned student names and
certain information relating to the academic performance of the named individuals. Id. at
308-09. The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the printing of the report violated
their privacy rights. Id. at 309; see also Rusack v. Harsha, 470 F. Supp. 285, 296 & n.18
(M.D. Pa. 1978) (noting that the privilege protects a House member's speech printed in
the Congressional Record); McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343, 347 (D.D.C. 1960)
(holding that the privilege applies to material inserted in the Congressional Record, even
when not spoken on the House floor).
139. 553 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
140. Id. at 1297-98. The senators would have been subject to suit had the information
been disseminated outside of Congress. Id. at 1297. But as it stood:
[Miere retention-without dissemination or use-of the copies cannot be the
subject of judicial inquiry. Such retention may be subject to abuse, but judicial
inquiry on a claim that documents were retained beyond the time needed to
determine relevancy to legislative purpose would embroil the courts in the kind
of review of legislative performance that is prohibited by the Speech or Debate
Clause.
Id. at 1297-98.
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in earlier cases whose claims fell more easily within the ambit of
"legislative business."1 41 While the Court recognized that Congress's role
142had expanded beyond the constructs of pure legislative activities, it was
disinclined to protect those "political errands.' 14 ' The Clause would
extend only to activities that are "generally" performed in the course of
enacting legislation, not those that are simply a corollary of the member's
conduct as a legislator.'"
The protection of political errands was at issue in Gravel.'4 While the
Court again recognized that modern legislatures are vastly more complex
and time-consuming than in years past,'46 and required the extension of
the privilege to aides and assistants,'47 it still declined to extend the
Clause to activities outside the necessary deliberations of legislative
141. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966). The Court asserted early
in its decision that the Clause did not shield the member from prosecution relating to
charges that he attempted to influence the Justice Department to dismiss pending charges
against certain defendants. Id. at 171-72. The Court definitively held that such conduct
was not "related to the due functioning of the legislative process." Id. at 172. Therefore,
the Court focused on preventing the Clause from protecting attempts to obstruct the
business of the executive and judicial branches, rather than the intra-legislative business of
Congress. Id.
142. The Johnson Court acknowledged that aides played a role in the congressman's
execution of his legislative duties. See id. at 173-74 (discussing the line of questioning,
which was later determined to be in violation of the privilege, that included an inquiry into
the work of the member's assistant in drafting an allegedly bribed speech). Only six years
after Johnson, the Court issued its first major decision outlining the so-called unprotected
"political" activities, United States v. Brewster. There, the Court took the opportunity to
limit Johnson and the realm of protected legislative activities as a whole. See United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 510-14 (1972).
143. See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512. The Court observed:
It is well known, of course, that Members of the Congress engage in many
activities other than the purely legislative activities protected by the Speech or
Debate Clause. These include a wide range of legitimate "errands" performed
for constituents, the making of appointments with Government agencies,
assistance in securing Government contracts, preparing so-called "news letters"
to constituents, news releases, and speeches delivered outside the Congress. The
range of these related activities has grown over the years. They are performed in
part because they have come to be expected by constituents, and because they
are a means of developing continuing support for future elections.
Id.
144. Id. at 512-14.
145. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
146. Id. at 616-17 ("[I]t is literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the
modern legislative process, with Congress almost constantly in session and matters of
legislative concern constantly proliferating, for Members of Congress to perform their
legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants.").
147. See id. at 621-22.
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acts.1' 8 An arrangement to publish a Senate subcommittee's classified
report through a private third party was not essential to the legislative
process.14 ' Therefore, the Court refused to preclude a grand jury from
subpoenaing the senator and his aides for questions relating to the
report's republication.
Courts also consider the informing function to be a political errand
well beyond the ambit of "legislative business." Courts have broadly
defined the "informing function" as including "press releases,
newsletters, and anything spoken outside of Congress.. 5. In a case
concerning a senator's newsletter to constituents that highlighted
allegedly excessive congressional spending, the Court did not consider
these communications to be an element of the legislative process. '52 Such
communications are necessarily subjective and reflect only the views of a
single member. Thus, they could not be granted the same protection as
committee reports, which reflect both the individual and collective views
of legislators.1 53
The circuit courts have also added to the line of "political matters" that
do not receive protection from the Clause. In Walker v. Jones, for
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
148. Id. at 626. The Court rationalized that "[t]he heart of the Clause is speech or
debate in either House." Therefore, privileged activities must fit within the ambit of the
"deliberative and communicative processes." Id. at 625. This includes general committee
and House proceedings concerning legislation, or those duties placed within the
framework of Congress as provided for by the Constitution. Id.
149. Id. at 626.
150. Id. at 626-27. The Court considered the informing function of the legislature, but
refused to extend that responsibility "as to immunize criminal conduct ... or to frustrate
the grand jury's inquiry" about possible violations of a federal criminal statute. Id. at 627;
see also United States v. Eilberg, 465 F. Supp. 1080,1083-84 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that
a legislative aide's testimony regarding a member's contact with an executive branch
officer was communication outside the realm of legislative activity).
151. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 6, at 1152. Professor Reinstein and Mr.
Silverglate contend that the informing function "is a fact of life" of the modern-day
legislature. Id. at 1151. They point to examples where members have extensively
republished sections of congressional hearings to shed light on alleged corruptive or
deceitful acts of the executive, judicial and legislative branches. Id. at 1151-52.
152. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1979); cf Consumers Union of
U.S., Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents Ass'n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(finding that a correspondents' association, acting under the direct authority of Congress,
was protected by the Clause when it denied press passes to a media organization, because
the association was acting like a Congressional aide and conducting business generally
before the House).
153. See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 133. But see Rusack v. Harsha, 470 F. Supp. 285, 296
(M.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that the Clause protects the right to inform an executive branch
officer via a letter concerning possible violations of federal law); Bowie v. Williams, 351 F.
Supp. 628, 632 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that a mailing to constituents is considered official
correspondence and part of the legislative process).
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held that the privilege did not extend to "'mundane fields' outside 'the
legislative core.", 154 Thus, a member was forced to defend himself in a
discrimination suit resulting from the discharge of a House employee.
In Hentoff v. Ichord, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
held that a member's so-called speaker "blacklist" exceeded the
congressional legislative function, and thus, the member could be held
116liable for the list's publication. Even though the list was within a
privileged congressional report, the court held that a member cannot "by
the mere process of filing a report devoid of legislative purpose,
transform these views into official action by the Congress." ''  As the
report had no legislative purpose whatsoever, the member could be
subject to a civil suit.'58
D. "Questioning" Under the Clause
Besides separating "Speech or Debate" into protected legislative
activities and unprotected political errands, courts have also addressed
the Clause's use of the term "questioning" in further clarifying the
privilege. The Clause protects congressmen from civil suits, criminal
prosecutions, and direct questioning in front of courts and grand juries
that would focus on any activity falling within the definition of
"legislative business."'59 Beyond these categories, courts have generally
held that the "questioning" portion of the Clause is tantamount to a
testimonial privilege, thereby protecting congressmen from both direct
questioning as well as disclosure of documents pursuant to a civil
subpoena.'6
Decisions concerning the Clause's testimonial privilege component
have centered on the issuance of subpoenas by grand juries and plaintiffs
161that may concern legislative acts. In the most direct case to decide the
issue, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, the D.C. Circuit
held that the testimonial privilege is absolute when properly applied,
154. Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Davis v. Passman,
544 F.2d 865, 880 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc), rev'd, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)).
155. See id. at 934.
156. Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (D.D.C. 1970).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975) ("We reaffirm that
once it is determined that Members are acting within the 'legitimate legislative sphere' the
Speech or Debate Clause is an absolute bar to interference." (quoting Doe v. McMillan,
412 U.S. 306, 314 (1973))); see also United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 184-85 (1966).
160. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 420 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
161. See infra Part IV.A.
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even in the case of a civil subpoena.'62 This is because courts have
construed subpoenas as testimonial, even though no direct questioning
takes place. 3 Thus, even if a congressman is only asked to produce
evidence to a grand jury or a plaintiff in a civil suit, courts have construed
this act as falling within the protection of the Clause.'6
Though the Clause is routinely applied to prevent inquiry into
legislative business and motives, courts have not read the Clause as
protecting the confidentiality of a congressman's legislative papers 65 In
fact, courts have allowed investigators to read through privileged
documents in order to construct a case, as long as the congressman is not
subject to a criminal indictment or questioning relating to any legislative
motive contained in those materials.'6
E. The Rationales Behind the Clause's Protections
The protections courts have read into the Clause have been grounded
on the idea that the Founding Fathers hoped to avoid the intrusions and
hostilities imposed upon the British parliament by an unruly Crown.
6 1
This acknowledgement must be read, however, in light of the American
constitutional scheme, under which Congress stands as an equal, and not
superior, branch of government.' 68 Thus, courts have long held that the
Clause was designed to prevent overreaching by the judicial and
executive branches, 69 and also to limit the distractions that accompany
civil suits and criminal prosecutions.7 0
162. Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 416.
163. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 37 (2000) (observing that "the act of
production" of documents in response to a subpoena "may certainly communicate
information about the existence, custody, and authenticity of the documents" produced);
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984) ("A government subpoena compels the
holder of the document to perform an act that may have testimonial aspects ... ").
164. See, e.g., MINPECO, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 859-60
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Dombrowski v. Burbank, 358 F.2d 821, 823-24 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
165. See In re Grand Jury Investigation into Possible Violations of Title 18, 587 F.2d
589, 597 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[The Clause] is not designed to encourage confidences by
maintaining secrecy, for the legislative process in a democracy has only a limited toleration
for secrecy.").
166. See, e.g., Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 46 (D. Md. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom., In re Guthrie, 733 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Possible
Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201,371,491 F. Supp. 211,214 n.2 (D.D.C. 1980).
167. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177-79 (1966).
168. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972) (noting that the Clause,
properly applied, should "insure the independence of the legislature without altering the
historic balance of the three co-equal branches of Government").
169. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 181; see also United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 369
(1980); Brewster, 408 U.S. at 524-25.
170. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975).
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Congressmen facing private suit or criminal prosecutions are often
"distract[ed] and force[d] ... to divert their time, energy, and attention
from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation. 1 71 In an effort to
ensure that congressmen are able to dedicate their time to proper
legislative business and are free to debate without fear of retaliation by
way of costly litigation, the Clause has been read to be an absolute bar to
interference, criminally and civilly, when it applies.72 This protection
includes not only actual litigation, but also proceedings leading up to
trial, such as discovery and depositions.73 Courts have recognized that
these activities impose significant burdens on congressmen.14
To uphold the other rationale behind the Clause's protections,
separation of powers among the branches of government, courts have
applied the Clause so as to ensure legislative independence. In Johnson,
for example, the Court held that the criminal prosecution of a member
for bribery that touched upon the motives of a speech was exemplary of
the "thrust" behind the American adoption of the Clause as an attempt
to thwart prosecutions of disfavored members of Congress.
175
Additionally, the Court has read the separation of powers principles
inherent in the Clause as a way to prevent the executive and judicial
branches from "oversight that realistically threatens to control [a
congressman's] conduct as a legislator.,
176
These two rationales do have their limits. In Doe v. McMillan, for
example, the Court refused to protect the public dissemination of
actionable material.7 It did not matter that the purpose behind the
communication was to inform the public; any other result would harm
the public and benefit few. Furthermore, the Court has limited theseparation of powers rationale by taking "a decidedly jaundiced view
171. Id.
172. Id. at 501 (collecting cases).
173. See MINPECO, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir.
1988); see also Eastland, 421 U.S. at 511.
174. See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503.
175. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181-82 (1966).
176. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972); see also United States v.
Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 491 (1979).
177. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 316-17 (1973) ("[W]e cannot accept the
proposition that in order to perform its legislative function Congress not only must at
times consider and use actionable material but also must be free to disseminate it to the
public at large, no matter how injurious to private reputation that material might be. We
cannot believe that the purpose of the Clause ... will suffer in the slightest if it is held that
those who, at the direction of Congress or otherwise, distribute actionable material to the
public at large have no automatic immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause but must
respond to private suits to the extent that others must respond in light of the Constitution
and applicable laws." (citations omitted)).
178. Id. at 316-17.
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towards extending the Clause so as to privilege illegal or unconstitutional
conduct beyond that essential to foreclose executive control of legislative
speech or debate and associated matters such as voting and committee
reports and proceedings. '
III. THE LONG AND WINDING, INVESTIGATORY, AND LITIGIOUS ROAD
OF REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM JEFFERSON
A. Cooperating Witness Leads to Major Federal Investigation
William Jefferson, elected to the House of Representatives in 1991,
was the first African-American congressman from Louisiana since
Reconstruction. 8  Jefferson became the focus of an intense federal
criminal investigation beginning in the spring of 2005."' In March of that
year, a "cooperating witness,"18 later identified as Lori Mody, a wealthy
investor and corporate executive, approached the FBI concerning her
involvement with an investment arrangement that included Jefferson. 83
Early in 2004, Mody contacted Brett Pfeffer, a former aide to
Jefferson, about joining her firm to broaden its philanthropist work. 14 In
June, Pfeffer introduced Mody to Jefferson at a luncheon in New
Louisiana. 185Jefferson discussed a Nigerian business ventureOrleans, oii a Jef o•dsusd i ia e  r
being explored by iGate, a high-tech telecommunications firm.
16
According to Mody, Pfeffer informed her that if the venture were
successful, Jefferson would "expect to get something out of it."187
179. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 620.
180. Resume of William J. Jefferson, http://www.house.gov/jefferson/biography.shtml
(last visited Jan. 10, 2008). Jefferson previously served three terms in the Louisiana State
Senate. Id. In office, Jefferson sat on both the House Ways and Means and Budget
Committees, was co-chair of the Africa Trade and Investment Caucus, and a member of
the Congressional Caucuses on Brazil and Nigeria. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 4; see also
Shailagh Murray & Allan Lengel, The Legal Woes of Rep. Jefferson, WASH. POST, Feb. 16,
2006, at Al. Jefferson has been described as someone who did his "homework" on
legislative issues, which often included publicly and privately financed trips, including
several to Africa. Murray & Lengel, supra.
181. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 3.
182. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 3-4.
183. See Murray & Lengel, supra note 180. Mody is the founder of Win-Win
Strategies Foundation. Id. Based in the Washington, D.C. suburb of McLean, Virginia,
the foundation's goal is to provide technology to children nationwide. Id.; see also
Affidavit, supra note 30, at 10.
184. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 10 (asserting that Pfeffer's role was "to seek out
various investment opportunities").
185. ld.
186. See id. at 7 (alleging that iGate "seek[s] to provide communications, data transfer,
media, internet and other services in Nigeria, Ghana and possibly other African Nations").
187. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 11.
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Over the next eight months, Mody and Jefferson met several times in
Washington, D.C., New Orleans, Louisiana, and Northern Virginia to
discuss the details of the venture.'8 At a June 25, 2004 meeting in
Jefferson's House office, Mody was introduced to Vernon Jackson, the
then Chief Executive Officer of iGate. 89 Jackson spoke about exporting
recent technological advancements to Nigeria9
After that meeting, Pfeffer and Mody further discussed the details of
the Nigerian venture. Mody's company would contribute $45 million to
obtain technology rights from iGate. Of this amount, $3.5 million would
be paid up front in cash, and the remainder would be financed via loans
from the Export-Import Bank of the United States.1 9 Mody agreed, and
authorized two transfers that July and September.' 92
After Mody's money transfers, Jefferson introduced her to a
representative of Rosecom, a Nigerian Internet company involved in the
arrangement.'9 The congressman then informed Mody that she must
retain Jefferson's daughter as counsel for the venture.'9 4 Several months
later, Jefferson and Mody again discussed the iGate deal, this time over
lunch in the congressional dining room.9 Jefferson allegedly told Mody
188. Id.
189. Id. at 4, 11.
190. Id. at 11. During this exchange, Mody was presented with a slide show on the
proposed Nigerian venture. Id. at 12. Mody was asked to join iGate in exploring the
possibility of financing the $45 million Nigerian venture. Jefferson and Jackson proposed
that Mody could make a small, initial cash investment, with the remaining balance
financed separately. Id.; see also Murray & Lengel, supra note 180.
191. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 12-13.
192. Id. at 13. Mody was under the impression that the money she transferred would
be used by a Nigerian company to acquire the rights from iGate. In actuality, only $1.75
million was used toward that purpose. Vernon Jackson allegedly spent the remainder
himself. Id.
193. Id. at 14.
194. Id. While the originally released affidavit redacts the daughter's name, it is clear
that the person referred to is Jamila Jefferson, the eldest daughter of the congressman.
Bill Walsh & Bruce Alpert, Nigerian Wanted A Cut, Tape Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans, La.), June 6, 2006, at A-1. Over the subsequent months, Mody paid thousands in
legal fees to Jamila Jefferson's firm, Jones Walker, based in New Orleans. Affidavit, supra
note 30, at 14. The same firm also employed Jefferson's former chief of staff. Press
Release, Jones Walker, Chief of Staff to Congressman William Jefferson Joins Jones
Walker (Sept. 28, 2004) (on file with author), available at http://www.joneswalker.coml
news/news-template.asp?ID=1816710132004. Jamila Jefferson assisted in forming W2-
IBBS, Ltd., Mody's Nigerian company involved in these transactions. Affidavit, supra
note 30, at 14. W2-IBBS; iGate; Rosecom, a Nigerian Internet firm; and NiTel, the
Nigerian state-run telephone company, were all allegedly involved in this scheme. Id. at
14; see also Walsh & Alpert, supra.
195. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 14.
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that he expected "five to seven percent of the ownership" of W2-IBBS,
Mody's newly-formed Nigerian company.196
Mody became weary of the business venture over the next few
months.' 7 She suspected that Pfeffer had forged her signature on several
documents and that he was drawing on company accounts without
authorization. 98 When Mody began inquiring about iGate's finances,
Jackson refused to cooperate, and the deal waned.199 In March 2005,
Mody approached the FBI.'°°
B. The FBI's Involvement
Less than a month after Mody contacted the FBI, they directed her to
meet with Pfeffer in an attempt to restore their business relationship.20'
Two weeks later, Jefferson, Jackson, and Mody met to discuss the
resurrection of the venture, and Jefferson made it clear that he wanted to
"get [the] deal out of the way. ''202 In May 2005, the congressman met
alone with Mody and speculated that certain people might be "pa[id]
off," including officials from Rosecom and the Nigerian government.
20 3
196. Id. at 14. The interest in the company was to be given "to his five daughters, to be
split equally among them." Id.
197. Id. at 15.
198. Id. Pfeffer later pled guilty to federal bribery charges. Ana Radelat, Former
Jefferson Aide Pleads Guilty in Corruption Probe (Jan. 12, 2006) (Gannett News Serv.)
(ProQuest database ID 969187171).
199. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 15. She "broke off ties" with Jackson after his refusal
to cooperate, and did not respond to email inquiries from either Jefferson or Jackson. In
one email exchange between Jackson and Mody, he made direct reference to Jefferson's
involvement in the Nigerian venture, including Jefferson's agreeing to travel to the
African nation as well as to "support the iGate-W2-IBBS efforts from a US-African Trade
perspective." Id. (emphasis omitted). In addition, Mody suspended Pfeffer's employment
with her firm. Id.
200. Id. at 16.
201. Id. Mody's first meeting with Pfeffer subsequent to her contact with the FBI
occurred on March 31, 2005. Id. at 16; see also Allan Lengel, FBI Says Jefferson Was
Filmed Taking Cash, WASH. POST, May 22, 2006, at Al.
202. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 17. Jefferson was asked if he planned to spend much
more time in Congress. Jefferson said he wanted to complete the deal and leave shortly
thereafter. Id.; see also Lengel, supra note 201. At the next meeting between Mody and
Jefferson, the congressman reiterated his intentions in seeing the Nigerian venture
through. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 17. Jefferson described his role in the venture as
being responsible for persuading NiTel to team up with Rosecom and W2-IBBS. ld. at 18.
203. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 19-20. Payoffs could be directed, according to
Jefferson, to the CEO of Rosecom, Suleiman YahYah, as well as various other
governmental officials. Id.; see also Walsh & Alpert, supra note 194. After documents
had been unsealed as a result of lawsuits filed by The Washington Post and The New
Orleans Times-Picayune, it was discovered that Jefferson had met with the vice-president
of Nigeria, Atiku Abubakar, in Nigeria. Walsh & Alpert, supra note 194. Abubakar
allegedly ran NiTel and Jefferson met with him as a part of a trip paid for by iGate. Allan
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At the same meeting, Jefferson inquired about a larger share in the
venture. 4 Jefferson asked that his share be increased to eighteen-to-
205twenty percent. Jefferson next presented Mody with financial
projections, and the congressman took the opportunity to again discuss
his stake. 20' On June 8, in Washington, D.C., Mody delivered to
Jefferson a stock certificate worth thirty percent of W2-IBBS. 27 The FBI
captured the exchange on videotape.'08 After the meeting, Jefferson
allegedly "promote[d] the Nigerian business venture through official acts
in his capacity as a United States Congressman.
'
,
209
Specifically, Jefferson acted as a conduit between the Nigerian vice-
president, the business interests in Africa, and Mody.10 Jefferson met
with Atiku Abubakar at the vice-president's Potomac, Maryland home.1
Lengel, Nigerian Entangled in Jefferson Investigation, WASH. POST, July 22, 2006, at Al.
Jefferson informed Mody that YahYah needed to secure a deal with NiTel. Walsh &
Alpert, supra note 194. The congressman then told Mody that YahYah had "a lot of folks
to pay off" and that YahYah should conduct that work without their direct knowledge.
Affidavit, supra note 30, at 19-20. Jefferson suggested that YahYah's work would help to
make the venture viable, and that he would tell the Nigerian, "[W]hatever you gotta do,
you do." Id.
204. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 20.
205. Id. at 20-21. This was a substantial increase from the five-to-seven percent
Jefferson originally requested. See id.; see also Radelat, supra note 198. In perhaps a
prelude of what was to come, Jefferson told Mody that "[a]ll these damn notes we're
writing to each other as if we're talking, as if the FBI is watching." Affidavit, supra note
30, at 21; see also Lengel, supra note 203.
206. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 21-22. In one section setting out the earnings
potential for the parties involved, Jefferson referred to a section titled "3rd party," saying
to Mody, "you can guess who that is." Mody understood that statement to "refer to
Jefferson's concealed interest in the iGate deal." Id. at 22.
207. Id. at 22-23. The certificate was in the name of "Global Energy & Environmental
Services, LLC," a Nigerian company that Jefferson and his family founded three years
earlier. The company, held in the name of his five children, was being run by his son-in-
law. Id. at 23 & n.13.
208. Id. at 23. At the meeting, Mody also agreed to make additional payments into the
venture, as well as to obtain financing through the Export-Import Bank of the United
States. Id.
209. Id. at 23-24.
210. See id. at 27-29. First, Jefferson wrote a letter to Abubakar, asking him to
purchase iGate products through NiTel. Next, Jefferson introduced Mody to a former
employee of the Export-Import Bank. Id. The employee gave Mody tips on how to
obtain a loan from the bank and suggested to her that if Jefferson were to speak on her
behalf, it would be highly influential. See id. at 28-29. Soon afterward, Jefferson himself
met with bank officials. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 27. Jefferson made no reference to his
financial stake in the venture. Id. Before this payment, Jefferson essentially was
gathering the parties for the transactions that ensued. According to the affidavit,
Jefferson's official acts only occurred after he received the stock certificate. See id. at 22-
24.
211. Lengel, supra note 203. Abubakar, a wealthy businessman, was once seen as a
frontrunner to become Nigeria's president. Id.
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Afterward, Jefferson relayed to Mody that the vice-president demanded
. 212
a financial stake, as well as an up-front cash payment as a "motivating
factor" to advance the venture.21 ' After meeting several times to discuss
the details of the payments to the vice-president, Mody agreed to provide
$100,000 in cash.214 On the morning of July 30, Mody met Jefferson at the
Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Arlington, Virginia."' After a brief discussion
inside the hotel, Jefferson followed Mody to the trunk of her car. The
congressman reached into the trunk, retrieved a leather briefcase
containing $100,000, and placed it in his automobile. FBI agents
211
videotaped the exchange.
Six days later, FBI agents executed a warrant to search Jefferson's
Washington, D.C. residence.217 Inside, they discovered $90,000 concealed
in the kitchen freezer.2 8 Based on the cash transfer and the search of
Jefferson's home, on May 18, 2006, the FBI applied for a warrant to
search his congressional office. The affidavit accompanying the warrant
detailed the documents that investigators expected to find within the
office, including those relating to Jefferson's meetings with Mody
212. See Affidavit, supra note 30, at 30. Abubakar wanted half the profits Rosecom
would receive as a result of the scheme. Id.
213. See Lengel, supra note 203; see also Affidavit, supra note 30, at 31. Jefferson first
proposed the idea of bribing Abubakar on June 17, 2005. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 29.
The congressman suggested that the money could be donated to a foundation headed by
the vice-president, which acted as a "front." Id. at 29-30.
214. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 31-32; see also Lengel, supra note 203.
215. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 32.
216. Id. at 32-33. The pair met again at the Ritz-Carlton two days later. Mody,
speaking somewhat cryptically about "African Art," asked if the vice-president had
received the briefcase. Jefferson said that he did, and that Abubakar was "very pleased."
Id. at 33.
217. Id. at 34. In addition, FBI agents also obtained a warrant to search Jefferson's
automobile. See Brief for Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of
Representatives as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3-4, In re Search of the
Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113 (Rayburn 1), 432 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.D.C.
2006) (No. 06-231 M-01), rev'd sub nom., United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg.,
Room 2113 (Rayburn 11), 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Bipartisan Brief]. A
search of Jefferson's New Orleans home for documents occurred on the same day as the
search of his Washington, D.C. home. Radelat, supra note 198; see also Allan Lengel &
Charles Babington, Congressman Tried to Hide Papers, Justice Dept. Says, WASH. POST,
May 31, 2006, at A4. That search concerned investigators, because Jefferson was present
and allegedly tried to conceal certain documents from FBI agents. Id.
218. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 34. Jefferson infamously stored the money in $10,000
increments "inside various frozen food containers and wrapped in aluminum foil." Id.
The serial numbers on the money found within the home matched those on the bills Mody
delivered on July 30, 2005. Id.; see also Phillip Shenon, FB.L Contends Lawmaker Hid
Bribe in Freezer, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006 at Al. Subsequent interviews with Jefferson's
legislative assistant revealed that the Congressman had given her $4,800, and about a
month later, Jefferson's attorney turned over another $4,900. Affidavit, supra note 30, at
34-35.
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219
concerning the Nigerian venture. Investigators sought to search "all
rooms, closets and items found therein that may contain evidence,
including items such as computer hardware and software and other
digital or electronic media as well as closed or locked containers.,
20
The FBI executed the warrant on Saturday, May 20, 2006, at
approximately 7:00 p.m. Agents refused to allow the House Counsel,
Jefferson's personal attorney, or the Capitol Hill police to view the
search."' Over the next eighteen hours, agents searched and seized
documents that matched the descriptions outlined in the affidavit 2  In
219. Affidavit, supra note 30, at 66-67.
220. Id. at 70. More specifically, Schedule B of the warrant listed four categories of
documents agents wished to search. See Bipartisan Brief, supra note 217, at 7 n.4. The
categories included documents from January 2001 to the date of the warrant's execution in
relation to thirty named parties; all documents during the same time period relating to
Jefferson's communications with African governmental officials and the same thirty
named parties; documents relating to "appointments, visits and telephone messages"
between Jefferson and the thirty named parties; and, copies of computer files relating to
those categories of documents. Id.
Federal investigators evidently asked for the additional leeway to obtain a greater
number of documents from Jefferson's office in light of their previous observation of the
congressman during the search of his New Orleans home. See Lengel & Babington, supra
note 217. An FBI agent involved stated that she "caught Jefferson slipping documents
into a blue bag in the living room." Id. The FBI used this incident to justify launching the
Saturday night raid on Jefferson's office without advance notice and without allowing
Jefferson to be present. Id.
221. Bipartisan Brief, supra note 217, at 6-7. Amy Jackson, Jefferson's personal
counsel, asked to be present during the search, claiming that "property owners or their
lawyers are regularly permitted to remain when their premises are searched." See
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Return of Property at 7, Rayburn 1, 432 F. Supp.
2d 100 (No. 06-231 M-01) [hereinafter Jefferson's Motion]. According to Jackson, an
agent replied that no one was allowed in the office, "not even counsel." Id. Jackson then
telephoned the lead prosecutor of the case, Assistant U.S. Attorney Mark Lytle, and
further inquired into the decision. Lytle replied that this was department policy, but did
send a copy of the warrant to Jackson. Id.
222. See Bipartisan Brief, supra note 217, at 6. Federal prosecutors laid out special
guidelines for this specific search for both paper and electronic files. See Affidavit, supra
note 30, at 74-75. In terms of searching paper records, prosecutors employed "non-case
agents" who had "no substantive role in the investigation." Id. at 75. These agents
reviewed paper records and compared them to a "schedule of effects" prosecutors
expected to find in the office. If these agents found responsive effects, they handed them
to a "Filter Team." Id. The team was comprised of one attorney from the U.S. Attorney's
Office for the Eastern District of Virginia, one attorney from the Justice Department's
Criminal Fraud office, and a non-case agent from the FBI. Id. at 75-76. This team was
tasked to confirm the presence of the effects on the prosecutors' schedule. Id. If they
were found on the schedule, they passed through a second examination to determine if
they were protected by the Clause. Id. If the team determined that an effect fell outside
of the Clause's protection, they would turn over the original to federal prosecutors; if they
determined that an effect was privileged, the team logged the evidence and provided a
copy of the entry to Jefferson's legal team. Id. at 76-77. This log and the actual effects,
however, were not passed along to federal prosecutors. Rather, they were to be returned
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all, investigators seized "one or two boxes of paper records, an
unspecified number of floppy disks, and copies of 14 computer hard
drives."2'
C. Jefferson's Motion for Return of Property
Three days after the search, Jefferson filed a motion for the return of
his property in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 4
Along with Jefferson's direct filing, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group
of the U.S. House of Representatives filed an amicus brief.22 The district
court decided the case July 10, 2006. Chief Judge Thomas Hogan framed
the question presented as whether the courts can extend the Clause to
"insulate" a member from the execution of a search warrant on his
226
congressional office. The court held that because the Clause was
designed to protect legislators only from compelled testimony, a validly
obtained and executed search warrant does not directly implicate the
227privilege. Addressing the rationales behind the Clause, the court heldthat because the search was designed to seize documents outside the
to Jefferson "without any further dissemination to the Prosecution Team." Id. at 77 & n.38
(emphasis added).
For electronic files, "non-case agents" from the FBI were to copy the hard drives of the
computers found within Jefferson's office. Id. at 78. This data was then to be turned over
to the FBI, so that a search for materials listed on the prosecutor's schedule of effects
could be conducted. Id. at 79. When the computer search was complete, files that
matched the schedule would be provided to the filter team, using the guidelines similar to
those employed for the second examination of paper effects. Id. at 79-80. Jefferson and
the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group for the U.S. House of Representatives challenged
the legitimacy of the filter team. Bipartisan Brief, supra note 217, at 8-11; Jefferson's
Motion, supra note 221, at 4-7.
223. Bipartisan Brief, supra note 217, at 7. The district court's decision mentioned the
two boxes of paper records and noted that the fourteen hard drives seized accounted for
every computer in Jefferson's office. Rayburn 1, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
224. Rayburn I, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
225. Id. The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group included three Republicans and two
Democrats: Speaker of the House J. Dennis Hastert, Majority Leader John Boehner,
Majority Whip Roy Blunt, Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, and Minority Whip Steny
Hoyer. Bipartisan Brief, supra note 217, at 1 n.i. Chief Judge Hogan recognized the
importance of the amicus brief from the House leadership. Rayburn 1, 432 F. Supp. 2d at
104-05 & n.2 (allowing the amicus curiae to file a brief was "recognition of the importance
of the House's interest in and position on the questions of serious constitutional
magnitude that are raised in this matter"). Throughout the decision, Hogan also made
several direct references to arguments advanced in the amicus brief. See, e.g., id. at 112,
114-16, 118.
226. Rayburn 1, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 110.
227. Id. at 111 ("[T]he testimonial privilege was not triggered by the execution of the
search warrant.").
2008]
Catholic University Law Review
legislative sphere by use of the FBI filter team, it did not "impermissibly
interfere with Congressman Jefferson's legislative activities.
The court directly dismissed the congressman's argument that for the
search to be permissible, he should have been afforded advance notice.229
The court refused the notion that Jefferson should have been given the
opportunity to screen and sort his effects prior to the warrant's
execution. The court reasoned that the "preconditions for a properly
administered warrant that seeks only unprivileged material that falls
outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity are sufficient to
protect against the harms assertedly [sic] being threatened here.
23 °
Allowing legislators the power of pre-search review would, in the court's
eyes, "eviscerate the effect and purpose of a search warrant wherever
legislative materials are kept., 231  If Congress' privilege became
"unilateral and unreviewable," it would immunize members from the
ordinary operation of criminal investigations. Jefferson's position
could destroy, rather than save, the balance of powers by elevating the
legislature's power over both the executive and judicial branches. 233 The
district court denied Jefferson's motion for the recovery of the property
seized; however, pending appeal, the D.C. Circuit enjoined the
Government from continuing its review of the seized materials.
D. The D.C. Circuit's Ruling
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit heard
oral arguments before a three judge panel on May 15, 2007. On August
3, the court determined that the search violated the Clause, and ordered
those papers that the district court found to be privileged returned to
Jefferson.235  The decision, by Chief Judge Ginsburg, held that the
warrant impermissibly compelled Jefferson to disclose privileged
228. Id. at 113. The court's decision distinguished between subpoenas, which
necessarily invoke testimony, and search warrants, which readily bypass the compulsion to
speak and must withstand the rigors of the Fourth Amendment. The latter were held to
be outside the scope of the Clause. Id.
229. Id. at 113; see also Jefferson's Motion, supra note 221, at 21-22. Jefferson also
argued that the FBI should employ the least intrusive means to obtain the desired effects.
See Jefferson's Motion, supra note 221, at 21.
230. Rayburn 1, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 114. Even if investigators were to view privileged
effects in the course of the search, past courts had not prevented a review of such
documents so long as they do not form the basis for a prosecution or a line of questioning.
Id.
231. Id. at 116.
232. Id. at 117.
233. Id. at 116-17.
234. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113 (Rayburn 11), 497 F.3d
654, 657-58 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
235. Id. at 656.
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materials to the executive branch. The court framed the issue as a
matter of when and how Jefferson may assert his privilege. Jefferson
argued that exercising the privilege must precede the seizure of
documents, while the Government contended that the FBI filter team
procedure sufficiently protected the congressman's speech immunity.2 3'
The court began its analysis by noting that the Supreme Court has not
. . 238
addressed this precise issue. After a brief examination of the history of
the Clause, the court addressed the relevant Supreme Court and D.C.
Circuit cases. The analysis of the cases first recognized that the Clause
has not been read narrowly so as to limit its application to only direct
questioning about legislative business.39 Prior D.C. Circuit cases,
particularly Brown & Williamson, held that parties to a lawsuit cannot
compel testimony or the production of documents from congressmen or
their aides.2'4  This conclusion was founded on the idea that the "key
purpose" of the Clause was to prevent the unwarranted intrusion of one
branch into the affairs of a co-equal branch of government. 24' Thus, the
court reasoned that because the bar on compelled testimony in civil cases
is absolute, the bar against compelled testimony in criminal cases is also
absolute .24 2
Applying this extension of civil subpoena rules to search warrants, the
court found that the FBI "must have" compelled the disclosure of
privileged documents during the course of the search.243 In effect, such a
compulsion disrupts the congressman's office, potentially reveals
embarrassing statements, and possibly "chill[s]" legislative activities.
T4
Addressing the notion advanced by both Judge Henderson's concurrence
and the district court's decision, that a search warrant does not compel
any testimony, the court of appeals noted that the documents seized were
within the ambit of "core legislative activities," further buttressed by the
"history of the Clause."
245
Further, the court was not persuaded by the Government's attempts to
work within the Clause while executing the search, including the use of
236. See id.
237. Id. at 659.
238. Id. at 659-60.
239. Id. at 660.
240. Id. In Brown & Williamson, the tobacco company issued civil subpoenas to a
House subcommittee seeking information about allegations that a former company
employee stole confidential records and subsequently handed them over to the committee.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 411-12 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
241. Rayburn H, 497 F.3d at 660-62.
242. Id. at 660.
243. Id. at 661.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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an FBI filter team, because Jefferson was not provided an opportunity to
246
view and possibly segregate legislative documents before their seizure.
Jefferson's presence in his office while the filter team was parsing
documents would place an undue burden on neither the FBI nor the
courts involved in later proceedings. The court reasoned that the
targeted legislator's presence would benefit any ensuing litigation by
247
reducing the number of disputed documents for courts to review.
The court lastly discussed Jefferson's argument that pursuant to Rule
41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Government
should return all papers seized in May 2006, whether the court deemed
them legislative documents or not.248 Finding that the executive branch
acted in good faith and noting that this is the only search of its kind to
take place in the history of the country, the court held that the "future
deterrence" effect of an exclusionary-type rule would be limited at
best.249 Additionally, the court relied on the absence of any claim from
Jefferson that the continued seizure of non-privileged documents would
disrupt the due course of business in his office.2 0 Thus, the court stopped
short of requiring all documents seized to be returned, instead instructing
the lower court to command the FBI to return documents that court
determined to be privileged.
E. Judge Henderson's Concurrence
Judge Henderson's concurrence agreed with the court's denial of
Jefferson's Rule 41(g) motion, but sharply broke away from the court's
252discussion of the applicability of the Clause to criminal search warrants.
She narrowed the question presented to the court as whether "Executive
Branch personnel - here, special agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation - [can] execute a search warrant directed to the
congressional office of a Member of the Congress without doing violence
to the Speech or Debate Clause," which she "directly answered 'yes.'
253
After discussing the warrant procedure and its execution, Judge
Henderson criticized the majority for "vastly over-read[ing]" Brown &
246. Id. at 662-63.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 663-64. The court viewed its role as determining "how to reconcile the
scope of the protection that is afforded to a Member of Congress under the Speech or
Debate Clause with the Executive's Article II responsibilities for law enforcement." Id.
249. Id. at 664.
250. Id. at 665 ("[T]he Congressman makes no claim in his brief, much less any
showing, that the functioning of his office has been disrupted as a result of not having
possession of the original versions of the non-privileged seized materials.").
251. Id. at 665-66.
252. Id. at 667 (Henderson, J., concurring).
253. Id. at 666-67.
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Williamson.25 She opined that since Brown & Williamson concerned
civil subpoenas issued to a congressional subcommittee, and was not in
any way related to the execution of a criminal search warrant, the
majority's reading of the case fell short of its actual holding.2 15 The judge
disagreed with the majority's finding that Brown & Williamson spoke
"'profound[ly].' on the applicability of the Clause to the general criminal
context; instead, the precedent "merely . . . 'repeatedly referred to the
functioning of the Clause in criminal proceedings.' ' 6 Judge Henderson
favored the FBI's filter team procedure and the other protective
measures the Government took to minimize the intrusion on both
Jefferson's office and his constituents, and was satisfied that those
safeguards prevented privileged materials from being used against
Jefferson in a subsequent prosecution.257
Lastly, Judge Henderson contended that the Clause, at its core, was
designed to "promote ... the Member's ability to be open in debate -
free from interference or restriction - rather than [create] any secrecy
right. 258  Jefferson was not forced to testify about any legislative
activities, and the Clause's protections are often diluted in the criminal
prosecution context in order to hold members of Congress to the same
standard as their constituents; thus, Judge Henderson concluded, the
Clause did not bar the execution of a search warrant on a congressional
office.259
IV. THE D.C. CIRCUIT OVEREXTENDED THE CLAUSE'S PRIVILEGE TO
INCLUDE PROTECTION FROM THE EXECUTION OF SEARCH WARRANTS
The Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution protects
members from being "questioned in any" place for "any Speech or
Debate in either House.,, 260 The Supreme Court has read the clause
broadly, in order to offer the requisite protection to members, but has
also imposed limits on the privilege, so as to not stifle criminal
prosecutions relating to non-legislative activities.161 Courts have beenreluctant to overextend the privilege to more than what is "necessary to
254. Id. at 669.
255. Id. ("I believe they vastly over-read Brown & Williamson. That holding
prohibited the production of certain records in a congressional subcommittee's possession
in response to a civil subpoena.").
256. Id. at 671 n.10.
257. Id. at 670.
258. ld.
259. See id. at 670-72.
260. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
261. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972).
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prevent indirect impairment" of legislative activities 262 and to keep true
to the original rationales behind the Clause: preventing legislative
disruption by third parties and the overstepping of separation of powers
boundaries by the executive and judicial branches.263
In Rayburn H, the D.C. Circuit incorrectly extended the Clause to
allow congressmen to be present and assert the Clause's privilege while
the executive branch seizes documents pursuant to a validly obtained
search warrant. 264 The court should have confined itself to the line of
cases that offered little protection to congressmen facing legitimate
criminal investigations and possible indictments, even when members of
the executive branch encroached on the privilege. 26' Further, the
decision is flawed as it too readily applies the Clause's testimonial
privilege to search warrants, fails to recognize the practical effects of its
ruling, and ignores the sufficiency of current procedures employed by the
judicial and executive branches to safeguard the congressional
privilege.266
A. Blurring the Line Between Subpoenas and Search Warrants
The privilege accompanying the Clause only attaches when a
congressman is being questioned or compelled to disclose information
relating to his legislative activities. The protection from testifying
about legislative business is absolute, whether the testimony is made
before a congressional committee or a jury, or in the production of
documents pursuant to a subpoena. 26' The D.C. Circuit's decision in
Rayburn H applied the principles of the Clause's testimonial privilege to
search warrants, concluding that such searches are prohibited by the
262. United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 760 (1st Cir. 1972), quoted in Gravel, 408 U.S.
at 625.
263. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975) ("In reading the
Clause broadly we have said that legislators acting within the sphere of legitimate
legislative activity 'should be protected not only from the consequences of litigation's
results but also from the burden of defending themselves."' (quoting Dombrowski v.
Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967))).
264. Rayburn II, 497 F.3d at 662-63 (majority opinion).
265. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 950, 952 (2d Cir. 1981) ("Speech or
Debate Clause protection does not extend to discussions . . . which involve only the
possible future performance of legislative functions."); In re Grand Jury Investigation into
Possible Violations of Title 18, 587 F.2d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[T]he privilege when
applied to records or third-party testimony is one of non-evidentiary use, not of non-
disclosure.").
266. See infra Part IV.A-C.
267. See United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d at 598).
268. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 416 (D.C. Cir.
1995) ("[T]he legislative privilege is 'absolute' where it applies at all.").
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Constitution. 26 The court, however, incorrectly applied the relevant case
law and failed to recognize the inherent differences between search
warrants and subpoenas.
Subpoenas and search warrants affect their targets in two wholly
different ways. 2'0 A subpoena forces its target to turn over documents or
to testify; it compels compliance. Thus, a subpoena is inherently
testimonial in nature.2 7' A search warrant, on the other hand, compels its
target to do nothing. There is no communicative aspect of submitting to
a search warrant, as its target is free from producing or authenticating
any document.272 Therefore it is possible for the same documents to be
communicative if retrieved pursuant to a subpoena and non-
273communicative if seized pursuant to a warrant.
Despite these notable differences, the court relied on a loose analogy
between compelled disclosures in civil cases and the general effect of the
search warrant executed in this case to conclude that the search was
274unconstitutional. Under the auspices of the Clause's blanketprotection against compelled testimony, the court readily spread that
269. Rayburn 11, 497 F.3d at 660-63.
270. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472-74 (1976) ("[A]lthough the Fifth
Amendment may protect an individual from complying with a subpoena for the
production of his personal records in his possession because the very act of production
may constitute a compulsory authentication of incriminating information, a seizure of the
same materials by law enforcement officers differs in a crucial respect - the individual
against whom the search is directed is not required to aid in the discovery, production, or
authentication of incriminating evidence." (citation omitted)); Adams v. New York, 192
U.S. 585, 597-98 (1904) (holding that the seizure of documents pursuant to a valid search
warrant did not constitute a violation of the accused's protection from self incrimination).
Further, search warrants must be particular and supported by pre-execution probable
cause. Subpoenas, on the other hand, may be broad in scope, issued without probable
cause, and can even be used for a fishing expedition when there is no suspicion of
wrongdoing. See Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1946); see also
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652-53 (1950) (upholding investigations
founded on "official curiosity" where "the inquiry is within the authority of the agency,
the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant"); Doe
v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 263-64 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[W]hereas the Fourth Amendment
mandates a showing of probable cause for the issuance of search warrants, subpoenas are
analyzed only under the Fourth Amendment's general reasonableness standard." (citing
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d 341, 247-48 (4th Cir. 2000))).
271. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 40 (2000). But see Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976) ("A subpoena .... does not compel oral testimony; nor
would it ordinarily compel the [recipient] to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the
contents of the documents sought.").
272. Rayburn 11, 497 F.3d at 669 (Henderson, J., concurring).
273. See Andresen, 427 U.S. at 473-75.
274. Rayburn 11, 497 F.3d at 661 (majority opinion).
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protection to the criminal context.27" As further basis for its decision, the
court facially and summarily concluded that circuit precedent was
"profound and repeatedly referred to the functioning of the Clause in
criminal proceedings.,
276
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit's decision ignores two key distinctions
laid out by the Supreme Court in Andresen v. Maryland and United States
v. Hubbell.2 7 In Andresen, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination simply does not attach to documents
seized pursuant to a validly obtained search warrant. This was so
because the target of the warrant was not compelled to "say or to do
anything., 278  While the privilege against self incrimination and the
Speech or Debate Clause are different, the line of reasoning stemming
from Andresen and its progeny certainly provide more guidance than
what the circuit court relied upon in Rayburn 11.279 Here, Jefferson was
never compelled to say anything. Jefferson was not forced to locate,
hand over, or authenticate a single document seized from his office, nor
was he questioned about any legislative activity. In short, the executive
branch did not violate Jefferson's testimonial privilege by executing a
non-testimonial search warrant.281
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit now appears to require Jefferson to do
exactly what the Supreme Court disapproved of in United States v.
275. Id. at 660 ("The bar on compelled disclosure is absolute, and there is no reason to
believe that the bar does not apply in the criminal as well as the civil context." (citation
omitted)); see also id. at 670-71 & n.10 (Henderson, J., concurring).
276. Id. at 660 (majority opinion).
277. 427 U.S. at 473-74 (1976); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
278. Andresen, 427 U.S. at 472-74, quoted in In re Search of the Rayburn House Office
Bldg. Room No. 2113 (Rayburn 1), 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 112 (D.D.C. 2006), rev'd sub nom.,
United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113 (Rayburn I1), 497 F.3d 654
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
279. Rayburn 11, 497 F.3d at 661 (referring to the "interpretation of the scope of the
testimonial privilege under the Speech or Debate Clause .... [and] the Supreme Court's
interpretation of what constitutes core legislative activities, and the history of the Clause."
(citation omitted)). That a seizure does not amount to compelled testimony has been
upheld in a variety of circumstances. E.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610-11 &
n.8 (1984) (upholding Andresen and Fisher); United States v. Haimowitz, 706 F.2d 1549,
1557 (11th Cir. 1983) (no compelled testimony when defendant's own papers were seized
pursuant to a valid warrant); United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110, 115-16 (2d Cir. 1980)
(no compelled testimony when evidence was lawfully seized pursuant to a search under
the automobile exception). But cf. United States v. Howell, 466 F. Supp. 835, 837-38 (D.
Or. 1979) (holding that approving of a search warrant after the government's attempt to
secure documents via subpoena could result in governmental abuse).
280. Cf Rayburn 11, 497 F.3d at 656-57.
281. Bribed Congressman, supra note 116, at 344 ("The reason the absolute privilege
has not been extended to bar criminal prosecutions for bribery is that the policy
justifications underlying civil immunity do not apply to criminal prosecutions.").
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Hubbell.i8 There, the Court overturned a ruling that required Webster
Hubbell, according to a plea bargain in which he promised to cooperate
in the Clinton-era Whitewater investigation, to produce over thirteen
thousand pages of documents and catalog them according to eleven
different "broadly worded" categories."3 The Court held that Hubbell's
assembly and cataloging of the documents was "the functional equivalent
of the preparation of an answer to either a detailed written interrogatory
or a series of oral questions . . . . "8 Hubbell, according to the Court, was
compelled to take the "mental and physical steps" necessary to account
for sources of potentially incriminating evidence, and thus, the lower
court violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.2
Like Andresen, Hubbell did not concern the Speech or Debate Clause.
Nevertheless, the Rayburn II court's extension of the testimonial
privilege of the Clause to criminal search warrants implicates the
protections afforded in Hubbell.26 Under the D.C. Circuit's ruling, if a
congressman does not waive his speech privilege, he is required to be
present during the warrant's execution and catalog thousands of
documents into "broadly worded" categories - privileged and non-
privileged - before the investigation may continue.27 This contradicts
the Clause's testimonial protection by essentially forcing the
congressman to "testify" by assembling his own documents into
categories for the benefit of federal prosecutors and courts.2 8  By
requiring a congressman to take this course of action, the court now
282. 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
283. Id. at 30-31, 42.
284. Id. at 41-42.
285. Id. at 42. The Court further disagreed with the Government's argument that
Hubbell's immunity did not prevent the derivative use of the documents, since his
cataloging was "simpl[y] physical." Id. at 43.
286. Cf. id. ("In sum, we have no doubt that the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination protects the target of a grand jury investigation from being compelled to
answer questions designed to elicit information about the existence of sources of
potentially incriminating evidence."). The Court's holding could be read to discuss non-
testimonial acts relating to document production (i.e., warrants) by negating the
Government's contention that the non-testimonial act of assembly can be divorced from
its "implicit" testimonial nature. Id. As the Court put it, that view "simply fails to account
for... realit[y]." Id.
287. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113 (Rayburn 11), 497
F.3d 654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
288. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 42 ("[1]t is undeniable that providing a catalog of existing
documents fitting within any of the 11 broadly worded subpoena categories could provide
a prosecutor with a 'lead to incriminating evidence,' or 'a link in the chain of evidence
needed to prosecute."').
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endorses the type of peril that the Clause was originally designed to
289prevent.
B. Sufficiency of Current Procedures
The court's willingness to allow Jefferson to be present during the
search and to view the documents desired by the Executive contradicts
decisions from sister circuits holding sufficient current judicial
proceedings that occur post-disclosure. Additionally, the court
disregards the safeguards employed by the executive branch by use of an
FBI filter team. Lastly, the court's ruling, an effort to craft a compromise
between the competing interests of the government and Congress, may
have instead further burdened both the government and legislators.290
1. Courts Have Approved of Executive and Judicial Review of
Privileged Documents
Contrary to the D.C. Circuit's holding in Rayburn H, other circuits
have held that the privilege has not been violated in instances where the
executive and judicial branches review protected effects in the course ofa lager .... 291
a larger investigation. As long as privileged materials have not formed
the basis of future questions or indictments, these circuits are satisfied
with the procedures employed by the executive branch. For example,
courts have read the Clause to uphold indictments and convictions in
cases involving document-by-document in camera reviews by the judicial
branch29' as well as presentations of privileged documents to grand
289. See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) ("The privilege would be of little value if
[congressmen] could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial
.... "); cf. United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 492 (1979) ("The exchanges between
Helstoski and the various United States Attorneys indeed indicate a willingness to waive
the protection of the Fifth Amendment; but the Speech or Debate Clause provides a
separate, and distinct, protection which calls for at least as clear and unambiguous an
expression of waiver.").
290. Editorial, Rep. Jefferson's Papers, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2007, at A12.
291. See, e.g., United States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283, 300 (3d Cir. 1994); United States
v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 941 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation into Possible
Violations of Title 18, 587 F.2d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 1978); In re Possible Violations of 18
U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F. Supp. 211, 214 & n.2 (D.D.C. 1980); see also United States v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 185 (1966).
292. See supra note 292. But see United States v. Helstoski, 635 F.2d 200, 205-06 (3d
Cir. 1980).
293. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d at 596-97. Here, the Third Circuit
held that Congressman Eilberg was entitled to an in camera hearing where he would be
permitted to indicate material he considered privileged. This was not an ex parte hearing;
the Government was given the opportunity to rebut the congressman's claims. See id. at
596. Therefore, the executive branch was exposed to allegedly privileged materials in the
presence of a judicial branch officer. Cf id Furthermore, the circuit court made clear
[Vol. 57:293
A Midnight Raid on the Constitution?
juries. 29t This is because the Clause only protects inquiries into legislative
activities and not the confidentiality of materials.
295
Therefore, it would make little sense to allow Jefferson the ability to
assert the privilege while the search was being executed if the judicial
branch possesses the power to review legislative documents in a private
196in camera setting to determine their privileged status. Moreover, if the
judicial branch already possesses the power to review any and all
documents seized pursuant to a subpoena, including disputed legislative
materials, the court failed to reason why the executive branch's power to
view the same documents during the course of executing a search
warrant is necessarily different or diminished.29  While the court
that the burden rested on the congressman, not the Government, to assert and defend the
privilege. Id. at 597. Finally, the circuit court held the Clause does not protect the
confidentiality of materials involved in in camera proceedings. Id.; see also Benford v.
Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 45 n.2 (D. Md. 1983) ("Unless the congressional
defendants are willing to drop their immunity claim altogether, at a minimum this Court
should examine the relevant documents supporting the claim, in camera, to determine
whether the congressional defendants have accurately characterized their content." (first
emphasis added)), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., In re Guthrie, 733 F.2d 634 (4th Cir.
1984); In re Possible Violations, 491 F. Supp. at 213-14.
294. See United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 950, 952 (2d Cir. 1981). In Williams, the
Second Circuit refused to dismiss an indictment against a Congressman after a grand jury
accessed protected legislative materials. Id. The court held that the privileged material
was not related to the indictment, and "raised no 'substantial question of whether the
grand jury had sufficient competent evidence to establish probable cause."' Id. (quoting
United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 941 n.10 (2d Cir. 1980)). Williams also dismissed a
claim by the congressman relating to a videotaped conversation shown to the grand jury
about certain promises connected to a bribe. Id. Because that evidence involved future
legislative acts, which are not protected by the Clause, the court allowed the indictment to
stand. Id.
The Fourth Circuit has similarly upheld a grand jury's indictment despite the
presentation of constitutionally impermissible evidence, here a floor speech. See United
States v. Johnson, 419 F.2d 56, 58 (4th Cir. 1969) ("Bias of a grand jury may be manifested
in several ways, but it has not been held to arise from the receipt of incompetent or
constitutionally impermissible evidence." (footnote omitted)); see also United States v.
Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511, 519 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[I]t is far from 'clear and indisputable' that
defendant could prevail on his arguments that presentation to the grand jury of evidence
in violation of the Speech or Debate Clause requires dismissal of the indictment."), affd,
442 U.S. 477 (1979). But see Helstoski, 635 F.2d at 205-06 (dismissing indictment where
grand jury had access to evidence concerning past legislative acts). Regardless, members
of Congress still retain the right to assert the privilege at trial. See Myers, 635 F.2d at 941-
42. For the purpose of avoiding an indictment, however, the Clause provides little or no
protection. See id.
295. See In re Possible Violations, 491 F. Supp. at 214 & n.2.
296. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113 (Rayburn I1), 497
F.3d 654, 662-63 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (discussing the steps necessary to satisfy the ruling,
including "judicial review of seized materials").
297. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d at 597. In that case, the court
expressly approved of the executive branch's viewing of privileged documents; documents
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reasoned that Jefferson's pre-seizure assertion of the privilege will save
time and resources and prevent compelled disclosure, the ruling lacks a
sufficient justification for such an overbroad reading of the Clause's
298protections in the criminal context.
2. Safeguards in Place were Sufficient to Protect the Privilege
Safeguards in place at the time Jefferson's office was searched
provided the congressman with the necessary protection from potential
abuses of the Clause at the hands of the executive. First, the FBI filter
team used to execute the warrant was able to effectively retrieve the
specific files described in the warrant application. While the amount of
time to seize the materials exceeded eighteen hours, it was conducted on
a weekend night when Congress was out of session. 99 The team
segregated files deemed potentially legislative in nature and provided the
full log and copies of every file seized to Jefferson and his counsel.3°° The
filter team was then tasked to update the district court and request that
the court review disputed materials, expressly leaving the final
determination to the court.30' In sum, the filter team assembled and
seized thousands of documents in a single night relating to one of the
largest congressional bribery scandals to occur in Washington, D.C."2
containing privileged material "may not be considered secret. Their examination by the
executive branch prior to submission to the Court does not violate the Congressman's
[privilege]. Thus there is no reason why the United States Attorney should be excluded
from participation in the judicial determination of the scope of that immunity." Id.; see
also In re Possible Violations, 491 F. Supp. at 214 n.2 ("The Speech or Debate Clause does
not protect the confidentiality of material. There is therefore little reason to exclude the
government." (citation omitted)); In re Search of 5444 Westheimer Rd. Suite 1570, No. H-
06-238, 2006 WL 1881370, at *3 (S.D. Tex., July 6, 2006).
298. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d at 596 ("While there is much to be
said for such a rule [privileging entire documents if portions of it are legislative], we think
it is foreclosed by Gravel v. United States, which authorizes rather wholesale rummaging in
the interest of discovering and prosecuting third party crimes." (citation omitted)); see also
Rayburn 11, 497 F.3d at 671 (Henderson, J., concurring) (finding that Gravel is not limited
to only third party criminal prosecutions); see also Charles W. Johsnon IV, The Doctrine
of Official Immunity: An Unnecessary Intrusion Into Speech or Debate Clause
Jurisprudence, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 535, 573 (1994) (discussing attempts to "graft the
common law doctrine of official immunity onto legislative immunity" as overextending the
Clause's purpose and original design).
299. Rayburn I1, 497 F.3d at 670.
300. See Affidavit, supra note 30, at 81.
301. See id. at 81-82.
302. While addressing the applicability of the Clause to the execution of a search
warrant, it is important to understand that the executive branch was investigating an
alleged bribery and corruption scheme. See id. at 1-2. In Brewster, the Court underscored
that "[t]o make a prima facie case under this indictment [bribery], the Government need
not show any act of appellee subsequent to the corrupt promise for payment, for it is
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Second, the government is precluded from presenting any legislative
materials to a jury in its case-in-chief. 3°3  The Clause's built-in
"exclusionary" rule sufficiently protects members who are threatened by
similar searches and intrusions into their work as legislators.O As the
executive cannot rely on privileged materials to make its case against
Jefferson, the damaging effect of the innocuous viewing of purported
privileged materials is greatly diminished. 3°5
Lastly, the court ignored the role the judicial branch played
throughout the warrant procedures and the protections the courts
provided Jefferson. The court failed to recognize the finding of probable
cause by Chief Judge Hogan, and the conclusion reached before
authorizing the search.306 Moreover, the court never addressed the need
for judicial approval of a search warrant, 307 or the protocols employed by
the FBI that constantly deferred to the courts. 30' The steps taken by the
executive branch were necessary elements in order to reinforce and
taking the bribe, not performance of the illicit compact, that is a criminal act." United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972).
303. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 183-84 (1966).
304. See id.; see also McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Leventhal, J.).
305. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113 (Rayburn 11), 497
F.3d 654, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984))
(discussing the application of the deterrent effect to the FBI's search warrant).
306. See In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113 (Rayburn 1),
432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 105-06 (D.D.C. 2006), rev'd sub non., United States v. Rayburn
House Office Bldg., Room 2113 (Rayburn 11), 497 F.3d 654.
307. See Rayburn 11, 497 F.3d at 663-64. Jefferson's actions leading up to the warrant's
execution shed light on both the need for the warrant and the need to keep Jefferson and
his counsel out of the office. See supra notes 198, 217; see also Lengel & Babington, supra
note 217. At the district court, Jefferson argued that the FBI must employ the least
intrusive means necessary to seize documents located in his House office. See Bipartisan
Brief, supra note 217, at 33. Jefferson and the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the
U.S. House of Representatives also suggested that the FBI should first negotiate See id.;
see also Reckless Justice, supra note 3, at 30 (prepared statement of Jonathan Turley, J.B.
& Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law, The George Washington
University Law School) (arguing that the legislative and executive branches have "long
maintained a level of mutual respect and restraint in the conduct of their respective
investigatory functions"). In terms of negotiations between the executive and legislative
branches concerning search warrants, the amicus contends that the Justice Department
must agree to "protocols and procedures that are pre-established." Bipartisan Brief, supra
note 217, at 34. This proposal would allow the member to be present during the search
and to self-select materials to be made available to the investigators. Id. at 35. It is hard
to imagine what, if any, concessions would be given to federal investigators if those two
procedures must "clearly" be part of the protocols employed. See id.
308. See supra notes 300-02 and accompanying text.
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uphold the proper checks and balances between the branches of
government.30 9
C. Disruptions Abound Under the D.C. Circuit's Ruling
The decision reached in Rayburn II raises the probability that future
criminal investigations into legislative corruption will encounter burdens
and disruptions exceeding those facing the circuit court. Few would
challenge the conclusion that the execution of the search warrant on
Jefferson's office occupied the congressman's time and attention, and
may have, in the words of the circuit court, "tend[ed] to disrupt the
legislative process. ' ' O The court, however, failed to complete the
analysis of the disruption caused by the search warrant or to consider
that its solution would only augment, rather than lessen, the burden on
federal investigators, legislators, and the courts.
First, the court's discussion of the disruption to Congressman
Jefferson's office and his duties as a legislator was unconvincing as a
rationale for holding that the search violated the Clause. For support,
the court relied on the assumption that the search necessarily disclosed to
the FBI potentially embarrassing statements between Jefferson and his
staff.3" Second, the court held that those disclosures would instill a
"chilling" factor between Jefferson and his staff and among fellow
members.3 2 Those conclusions, however, only tend to show a minor
disruption for Jefferson, not the type of distraction that would necessitate
a circuit court interpreting the Constitution in order to prevent future
313
occurrences.
In order for the Clause's protections to apply, congressmen must show
that the civil proceeding or prosecution would cause serious harm to the
legislative process and the ability to engage in open debate.3 4  Here,
309. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 761 (1982) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Even
prior to the adoption of our Constitution, as well as after, judicial review of legislative
action was recognized in some instances as necessary to maintain the proper checks and
balances.").
310. Rayburn If, 654 F.3d at 661.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) ("In all events, the question
whether a specific case should receive exceptional treatment is more appropriately the
subject of the exercise of judicial discretion than an interpretation of the Constitution.").
314. See Bribed Congressman, supra note 116, at 345 ("Before the absolute immunity
developed in defamation cases can be invoked as a bar to criminal prosecution, it must
appear that the possibility of criminal prosecution for bribery would inhibit honest
speech." (footnote omitted)); see also Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 46 (D.
Md. 1983) (holding the Clause creates testimonial privilege "only for the purpose of
protecting the legislator and those intimately associated with him in the legislative process
from the harassment of hostile questioning"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., In re
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Jefferson and the court have not met the burden of proof imposed by
other courts, most notably the Supreme Court in Clinton v. Jones, which
held that simply being a party to a lawsuit or related proceedings is
insufficient to warrant a separation of powers disruption claim."' The
possibility that several members of a neutral FBI filter team perusing
purported legislative documents would inhibit free and open debate
among members of Congress is simply too weak a contention to
"implicate constitutional separation-of-powers concerns."3"6 Moreover,
Jefferson and the circuit court admitted that the loss of the original
copies of the seized documents had not unduly harmed the due
functioning of his congressional office."' Even with this admission a full
year after the initial search, the court nevertheless concluded that the
search offended the rationales underlying the Clause, and opted for a
318broad decision with unknown consequences.
Second, implementing Rayburn II's ruling will likely frustrate the good
intentions of the court. By mandating a congressman's presence during
the execution of a search warrant and allowing him to individually assert
the privilege on any and all documents passing through a filter team, the
court laid the groundwork for a more intrusive and disruptive procedure
for executing validly obtained warrants.3" 9 Under the court's ruling,
Jefferson and his personal counsel must accompany the FBI filter team
Guthrie, 733 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1984). Courts addressing other constitutional immunities
allegedly violating the separation of powers have focused on whether the subsequent
distraction prevents the official from carrying out his assigned duties. See Nixon v. Adm'r
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) ("Only where the potential for disruption is
present must we then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to
promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress."); see also Public
Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 484-85 (1989) (applying the test to the
powers of the presidency with respect to the Appointments Clause) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 383-84 & n.13 (1989) (applying the
test when prisoners challenged the constitutionally of the Sentencing Commission);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (applying the test when deciding the
constitutionality of the Ethics in Government Act, under which an independent counsel is
appointed by a special court rather than the Executive).
315. Clinton, 520 U.S. at 705-06 & n.40 ("We recognize that a President, like any other
official or private citizen, may become distracted or preoccupied by pending litigation.
Presidents and other officials face a variety of demands on their time, however, some
private, some political, and some as a result of official duty. While such distractions may
be vexing to those subjected to them, they do not ordinarily implicate constitutional
separation-of-powers concerns."); see also United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 182
(1966).
316. See Clinton, 520 U.S. at 705-06 & n.40.
317. Rayburn 11, 497 F.3d at 664 ("On appeal, however, the Congressman makes no
claim that the functioning of his office has been impaired by loss of access to the original
versions of the seized documents.").
318. Id. at 660-61.
319. Rayburn 11, 497 F.3d at 670 (Henderson, J., concurring).
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as its members sift through every page of every document described in
the warrant application and individually determine its legislative
nature. This is a departure from the previous route endorsed by the
executive branch and other courts that allowed neutral filter teams to
screen out potentially privileged effects,32' and then bring those to the
attention of a reviewing court during a private in camera hearing.322
Next, the court's ruling will undoubtedly force Jefferson to dedicate
more time, resources, and attention to the execution of the warrant than
under previous procedures, by forcing him to review each and every
document to determine its legislative content. 3n The previous
procedures employed by the FBI allowed the executive branch to first
determine the need for the documents in its investigation and then to
determine their legislative content. 324 This approach, contrary to the
circuit court's view, would lessen the burden on reviewing courts. Under
previous procedures, in camera reviews focused solely on documents the
FBI desired for its investigation, but the privileged status of the
documents remained unclear. Under Rayburn II, in camera reviews will
now focus on a member's diligence in pre-seizure assertions of the
Clause. This will necessarily broaden the scope of the review to
determine whether the member of Congress properly applied the
privilege to documents beyond those required by the FBI.325 The
additional burden on the courts and the targeted congressman runs
counter to the rationales of the Clause by requiring increased judicial
review of privileged effects and additional time and resources of the
congressman and his staff.
3 6
320. Id.
321. See United States v. Grant, No. 04 CR 207BSJ, 2004 WL 1171258, at *1-3
(S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2004) (allowing an independent taint team to seize documents
potentially privileged by the attorney-client relationship); United States v. Triumph
Capital Group, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31, 43 (D. Conn. 2002) (same); Benford v. Am. Broad.
Cos., 98 F.R.D. 42, 45 (D. Md. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., In re Guthrie, 733
F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1984).
322. See supra note 293.
323. This point was underscored in Judge Henderson's concurrence. Rayburn 11, 497
F.3d at 669-70 ("Although the presence of FBI agents executing a search warrant in a
Member's office necessarily disrupts his routine, the alternative procedure proposed by
Rep. Jefferson - sealing the office and permitting him to first label his records (paper and
electronic) as privileged and unprivileged - would no doubt take much more of his
time.").
324. Id. at 656-57 (majority opinion).
325. See United States v. Grant, No. 04 CR 207BSJ, 2004 WL 1171258, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
May 25, 2004) (upholding use of filter team procedure, as it will "narrow the disputes to be
adjudicated and eliminate the time required to review the rulings of a special master or
magistrate judge").
326. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 705 (1997) ("The burden on the President's
time and energy that is a mere byproduct of such review surely cannot be considered as
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V. CONCLUSION
Rayburn H incorrectly applied the protections of the Clause to a
validly obtained search warrant properly executed by the executive
branch. The D.C. Circuit contradicted the original purpose of the
Speech or Debate Clause and further erred in applying rules solely
designed for testimonial subpoenas to a non-communicative search
warrant. Long after Jefferson is prosecuted for his alleged involvement
in an international bribery scheme, the effect of the court's ruling will
still be unknown. What is known is that the court took a drastic step
toward expanding the Clause's protection to criminal contexts envisioned
by neither the Founding Fathers or the courts that first interpreted the
privilege."'
onerous as the direct burden imposed by judicial review and the occasional invalidation of
his official actions.").
327. See Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865, 881 (5th Cir. 1977) ("If legislators are bound
by the law they create, they are even more clearly bound by the United States
Constitution. The very premise upon which the Constitution stands is the equality of all
persons before the law. Exceptions to that premise must be limited, guarded, and
sparingly employed."), rev'd on other grounds, 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc),
rev'd, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
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